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Background 
 
At the September 1999 Annual meetings of the World Bank and the IMF, Ministers of 
member countries endorsed the proposal that country owned poverty reduction strategies 
should provide the basis of all World Bank and IMF concessional lending, and should 
guide the use of resources freed by debt relief under the enhanced HIPC initiative. Based 
on this agreement World Bank, IMF, multi-lateral and bi-lateral donors have been en-
gaged in dialogue to assist countries in preparing their Poverty Reduction Strategy papers 
(PRSP). They are built on research, experience, and, most importantly, innovative and 
successful programs pursued by the countries themselves, to ensure that the needs of the 
poor come first in the formulation of public policy. However, what are the needs of the 
poor, and how can a country make sure that it addresses these needs in an appropriate and 
meaningful manner?  
 
It has widely been acknowledged that the poor are the most vulnerable in society, mainly 
as they are ill-equipped to manage diverse risks ranging from natural (such as earthquake 
and flooding) to manmade (such as war and inflation), from health (such as illness) to 
political risks (such as discrimination). Thus, governments and other stakeholders are re-
quired to adopt a forward looking and pro-active role in poverty reduction. They need to 
improve the availability of and the access to instruments that help the poor better manage 
risks, in order to reduce their vulnerability and over time escape poverty (see Alwang et 
al., 2001; Heitzmann et al., 2001; Siegel et al., 2001; Holzmann and Jørgensen 2000; 
1999; World Bank, 2000c). 
 
Social protection (SP) interventions are particularly crucial in this respect as they shape – 
together with other social sector interventions – the development process. Given their 
heavy bearing on the poor’s livelihood strategies, it is vital for policy-makers to have a 
profound understanding of the performance and effectiveness of existing SP interven-
tions.  
 
Public expenditure reviews (PERs) are one instrument that assists policy-makers in this 
respect. PERs are essentially comprehensive macro reports with a mandate to focus on 
the efficiency and efficacy of resource allocation. Some PERs are sector specific. While  
both health and education have been covered several times, SP expenditures have not yet 
been included properly in PER work.  
 
Moreover, public expenditure reviews so far have not considered the many inter-linkages 
and cross-cutting issues between the social sectors, which consist basically of health, 
education, nutrition, social protection, water and sanitation. For example, empirical evi-
dence suggests that improving education outcomes correlates with better health out-
comes, etc. Reviewing health and education separately will not allow to examine and ad-
dress this important relationship. Thus, all social sectors need to be reviewed jointly in 
order to optimize the linkages and prioritize interventions. Currently, the World Bank 
works on such a framework under the lead of the chief economist of the Human Devel-
opment Network, Shantayanan Devarajan.   4 
Objectives and Structure of the Paper 
 
The aim of this paper is to provide some guidance on how to carry out a SP expenditure, 
performance and finance review – given the absence of social protection in PER work to 
date. Such a review will enable countries (i) to better use their SP budgets as a proactive 
instrument in addressing vulnerability and welfare concerns, and (ii) to propose solutions 
that ultimately aim at reducing poverty and maximizing social welfare. 
 
Currently, many reviews of government expenditures and selected policy areas are under-
taken by a number of institutions (e.g., the Bank PERs, IMF’s GFS, the Social Protection 
Expenditure Reviews of ILO, as well as many other reviews of bilateral donors and mul-
tilateral organizations). These reviews serve a variety of purposes. However valuable 
these different reviews are, they use different definitions and concepts, and demonstrate 
the lack of agreement about the best methods to estimate the effectiveness of expendi-
tures. The guideline proposed here, which is essentially a blown-up version of the World 
Bank’s sectoral PER, could be used as a common framework, which – if implemented – 
will help international institutions (as well as bi-lateral donors) and countries to undertake 
reviews with comparable results. This has at least two main effects: It enables the devel-
opment of benchmarks for countries, and allows to learn from experiences of other coun-
tries. Moreover, once a methodology is established, institutions, bi-laterals and countries 
will be able to outsource these reviews to international and local consultants; whose work 
and results can be much better monitored and benchmarked. Finally, as proposed in the 
recent meetings between  IMF, ILO, and the World Bank, SP reviews based on a joint 
methodology can be used to form the basis of an operational partnership at the country 
level between these agencies. 
 
The guideline we propose here largely follows the traditional approach adopted for public 
expenditure reviews in the World Bank. It differs, however, in one important aspect: 
While most PERs tend to narrowly focus on the government budget, we propose to also 
consider activities that do not feature in the budget, i.e., interventions from the private 
formal and  informal sectors. This is especially critical for social protection, as non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), large donors or market-based systems, as well as 
households and communities provide or sponsor important programs which are – even 
though outside the government – nonetheless an important part of the SP system, and 
have to be considered in an analysis concerned with evaluating SP issues.  
 
The various tasks that are necessary to carry out a comprehensive SP expenditure, per-
formance and finance review will be identified. This paper does not, however, repeat es-
sential PER methodology. At the end of this paper, we provide some templates (see An-
nex 1) that will assist analysts in the conduct of their work. The reviews shall primarily 
be carried out by country officials (e.g., directors of budgets and/or planning from finance 
and social sector ministries) with assistance of local researchers and with technical assis-
tance from IMF/ILO/WB and other donors as required.  
 
In what follows, the first section intends to provide some conceptual underpinnings. Ana-
lysts who are entrusted with carrying out this review might want to consult this section 5 
for clarification of the approach, or skip it and turn straight to the guideline as such. In 
section 1.1, social protection will be defined for the purpose of this paper, and the con-
ceptual framework for this definition will be discussed. Then, the rationales for public 
interventions, which are the benchmarks for the allocation of scarce public resources, will 
be presented (section 1.2).  
 
From the second section onwards, some guidance is provided for the conduct of a com-
prehensive SP expenditure, performance and finance review. Section 2 is concerned with 
the identification of relevant SP activities in a country (section 2.1), and provides some 
suggestions on how to classify these activities in a meaningful way (section 2.2). The 
third section includes proposals on how to monitor the overall effectiveness of SP inter-
ventions applied, both in terms of outcomes (section 3.1) and risk/risk exposure (section 
3.2). This will allow to identify both gaps in coverage, and shortcomings with regard to 
the existing mix of SP interventions (section 3.3). The fourth section is then concerned 
with assessing the effectiveness and efficiency of SP interventions. This includes an 
overall assessment of the policy framework in a country (section 4.1), and suggestions on 
how to examine specific SP interventions in more depth (section 4.2). The focus of this 
section is thereby on instruments that – while sometimes part of traditional PERs – might 
prove particularly relevant in the context of social protection. In the final section, the 
main issues with regard to a review of SP interventions are summarized, and a way for-
ward is proposed (section 5).  
 
 6 
1.   Conceptual underpinnings 
 
In this section, main conceptual underpinnings are outlined. This includes both a discus-
sion of the definition of SP applied (see section 1.1), and a discussion of rationales of 
why the public sector should (or should not) engage in the provision or finance of SP in-
terventions – given the scarcity of public resources and the need to make complex alloca-
tion decisions (section 1.2).  
 
 
1.1  Social protection: Definition and conceptual background  
 
Social protection is traditionally defined by its program components, which essentially 
consist of labor market interventions (including child labor), social insurance (including 
pensions), and social safety nets (including social assistance and social funds). This nar-
row conceptualization provides little guidance on how SP can contribute to effective pov-
erty reduction beyond passive income redistribution. Thus the SP sector in the World 
Bank (2001a:9ff.) has adopted a new strategy based on a broader definition of social pro-
tection which is presented below (section 1.1.1).  
 
1.1.1    Definition of social protection  
 
According to this new approach, SP interventions are (i) public interventions that assist 
individuals, households, and communities to manage risk better, and (ii) that provide 
support to the critically poor (World Bank, 2001a:9). This definition is based on the so-
cial risk management framework (Holzmann and Jørgensen, 2000; 1999), which a c-
knowledges that all individuals, households, and communities are exposed to multiple 
risks from different sources. Poor people are typically less equipped to manage these 
risks than other population groups which makes them more vulnerable to these risks, and 
their adverse outcomes. SP interventions are among the instruments that aim to reduce 
this vulnerability by (i) improving the instruments available to manage risks, and/or by 
(ii) helping the critically poor. 
 
According to this broad definition, SP interventions are thus not only perceived as a 
safety net, but also as a springboard: While a safety net for all should exist, the programs 
should also provide poor people with the capacity to climb out of poverty. SP interven-
tions are regarded as investments rather than costs. It is acknowledged that transfers to 
cope with a shock may not accomplish the same goal, as helping the poor to maintain 
their access to basic social services during shocks. This requires that SP should focus not 
only on the symptoms, but also on the causes of poverty (World Bank, 2001a:9). 
 
In the following section (section 1.1.2), the main rationale behind this broad definition of 




1.1.2  Risk and risk management 
 
SP is concerned with helping the critically poor, and with assisting them to better manage 
risk. The main rationale for this focus on risks is derived from the conviction that house-
holds are vulnerable, because they are exposed to risks, and might not be well equipped 
to manage these. These sources of vulnerability (risk exposure and insufficient risk man-
agement) might lead to poverty (or deepen poverty of the poor). Thus, SP, as well as in-
terventions of other sectors, have to address and reduce vulnerability by improving risk 
management. 
 
Box 1: Risk and vulnerability: The “risk chain” 
 
                                                                                   Risk 
 
 
  Vulnerability                                                                Risk management 
 
 
                                                                          (Expected) Outcome (e.g., poverty) 
 
Vulnerability can be decomposed into three parts of a “risk chain”: 
 
     (a) Risk: Risk is a probability distribution of events which – if they materialize – might cause a welfare  
     loss which might be substantial enough to push non-poor households below the poverty line, or poor 
     households deeper into poverty. 
      
     (b) Risk management: Risk management, or risk response, comprises all actions taken to respond to  
     downward sides of a risk. Risk management can be applied before a risk occurs, or after it has been 
     materialized. 
 
     (c) Outcomes: The risk together with the risk responses lead to an (adverse) outcome.  
 
Vulnerability is the forward-looking state of expected outcomes, which are in themselves determined by 
the magnitude, timing and history of risks and the risk responses. Households are vulnerable if a shock is 
likely to push them into (or deeper into) poverty (or any other predefined threshold).  
  
Source: Heitzmann et al., 2001: Box 1 
 
Vulnerability of households
1 can be decomposed into several components of a “risk 
chain” (see Box 1, and Heitzmann et al., 2001, from which the following is largely de-
rived): a) the risk, or risky event, b) the options for managing risk, or the risk response, 
and c) the outcome in terms of welfare loss. A household
2 is vulnerable to suffering an 
undesirable outcome, and this vulnerability to a welfare loss comes from risks. The re-
sponses of a household to risks (and/or the outcomes caused by this risk) are essential to 
                                                 
1 We use the term households to include individuals and households. The vulnerability of individuals 
within a household and intra-household dynamics can also be important to understanding household vul-
nerability.  
2 Clearly, risks do not only threaten individuals and households, but larger communities, such as regions, a 
whole nation or even more than one nation. In this paper, we will, however, confine the discussion to 
household risks only. 8 
understand its vulnerability
3. The search for the optimal vulnerability reduction thus in-
volves to understand risks, and the outcomes they produce, as well as the most efficient 
means (and tradeoffs) of managing risks (Alwang et al., 2001:2). 
 
(i)   Risk and risk exposure 
 
Vulnerability thus begins with a notion of risk. Risk is characterized by a probability dis-
tribution of events. These events are themselves characterized by their magnitude (includ-
ing their size and their spread), their frequency and duration, and their history – all of 
which affect vulnerability from the risk. Whether individuals or households are actually 
exposed to risks depends on various factors. For example, exposure to health risks de-
pends on the existing health and nutritional status of the individuals, their physical assets 
such as housing, infrastructure and household location, as well as on their information 
and behavior, as all of these (and other) factors determine their exposure to this type of 
risk.  
 
(ii)   Risk management  
 
If the expected consequence of a risky event is likely to result in a welfare loss, house-
holds can respond to, or manage, risks in several ways – given that risk management in-
struments are available and/or households have access to them. Following Holzmann and 
Jørgensen (2000; 1999), at the present time (t=0) it is possible to separate risk manage-
ment into ex ante and ex post actions. Ex ante actions are taken before a risky event takes 
place (t–1), and ex post management takes place after its realization (t+1).  
 
Ex ante risk reduction strategies essentially comprise three different types (see also Box 
2): (a) Risks can be reduced or eliminated (risk reduction or prevention), (b) exposure to 
risk can be lowered, and (c) actions can be taken to provide for compensation in the case 
of loss (risk mitigation). Measures to reduce or prevent risks focus on the risk itself and 
target the downward side of it. Measures to lower risk exposure attempt to reduce the 
susceptibility of individuals, households, communities, regions or nations to risk. Meas-
ures to mitigate risks focus on the expected outcome of a risky event, and provide com-
pensation in the case of loss. Risk mitigation includes formal and informal responses to 
expected losses such as self-insurance (e.g., precautionary savings in financial or other 
assets), formal insurance, portfolio diversification, hedging or the establishment of social 
networks. 
 
Ex post risk coping activities are responses that take place after a risk has materialized. 
Coping involves activities to deal with realized losses (or: actual losses) by way of selling 
assets, seeking “emergency” loans (from relatives and friends, moneylenders, banks), re-
moving children from school, migration of selected family members, seeking temporary 
employment, etc. Some governments provide formal safety nets such as public works 
programs, food aid, and other transfers that can help households cope with risk. Again the 
                                                 
3 How a shock is transmitted to households – and how households are able to respond to it – depends 
largely on the assets of the households (Siegel and Alwang, 1999), as well as a country’s institutions, and 
policies.  9 
effects – and tradeoffs – of different coping strategies have to be examined carefully. 
While removing children from school might be an efficient response to lower expendi-
tures after an income loss, this strategy increases the vulnerability of children and their 
families with regard to future risks they will encounter.   
 
Box 2: Risk management strategies: forms, aims and focal points  
 
 
Ex ante risk management 
Risk reduction 
Lowering risk exposure 
Prevents or reduces risk  
Lowers risk exposure 
Risk mitigation   
     Portfolio  Provides compensation against expected loss (based on expected outcome) 
     Insurance  Provides compensation against expected loss (based on expected outcome) 
     Hedging  Provides compensation against expected loss (based on expected outcome) 
 
Ex post risk management 
Risk coping  Copes with the realized losses associated with a risky event 
Source: adopted from Heitzmann et al., 2001: Box 2. 
 
Actors in risk management (see Box 3) are individuals and households, communities, 
NGOs, the public sector (at a local, regional and national level), market-based companies, 
donors or international organizations (for more information on these actors, see 
Holzmann and Jørgensen, 2000). All of these actors play a dual role in risk management: 
they (i) are exposed to risks and have to manage them, and (ii) they provide (and/or fi-
nance) risk management instruments. It is important to emphasize that all actions applied 
by different actors and at different levels affect risk and vulnerability at other levels or 
actions taken by other actors (see Holzmann and Jørgensen 2000; Siegel and Alwang, 
1999). 
 
It is helpful to differentiate risk management activities of different actors by their ar-
rangement, i.e., their degree of formality (see Box 3). Informal arrangements (such as 
marriage, mutual support, savings in real assets, etc.) are risk responses that reflect self-
protection by individuals, households or communities through informal/personal a r-
rangements. Market based arrangements (such as financial assets or insurance contracts) 
require diverse well-functioning market institutions (including a central bank, banking 
system, securities markets and insurance companies). Publicly mandated or provided ar-
rangement, such as social insurance, transfers or public works, are often provided in case 
that the informal or market-based arrangements break down, are dysfunctional or do not 
exist. When it comes to assess the efficiency, equity and sustainability of such instru-
ments (as for example in public expenditure reviews) the degree of formality of risk man-
agement instruments becomes relevant. 
 
Risk management actors can also be differentiated according to the different levels at 
which they operate or at which they are linked (see Box 3). For example, households 
manage risks at a micro level, communities at a meso level, etc. Several actors have the 
potential to manage risks at different levels. For example, public institutions can inter-10 
vene at a meso (e.g., through its local and regional governments) or a macro level (e.g., 
through its national government).  
 
Box 3: Actors in risk management by levels of formality and intervention 
 
  Levels of formality 
Levels of intervention  informal  formal  public 
micro  Individuals, households  Market-based companies  -- 
meso  Communities, NGOs  Market-based compa-
nies, donors, interna-
tional organizations 
Local or regional gov-
ernments 








ment (e.g., EU) 
Source: Heitzmann et al., 2001: Box 3 
 
(iii)   Outcomes 
 
Risks, combined with the household responses lead to the outcome. Whether a household 
is vulnerable to an outcome has to be judged against some benchmark which is a socially 
accepted minimum reference level of welfare (for example, the poverty line). It is impor-
tant to stress that welfare losses, in and of themselves, are not sufficient to define a 
household as vulnerable – only if the welfare loss (often called the hazard) is so substan-




Clearly, given the different distribution of assets between households, one and the same 
event can have different welfare effects. For example, a drought can destroy most of the 
few assets of a very poor family, and push them below the poverty threshold, while it 
might not have the same consequence for a family with a stronger distribution of assets. 
Similarly, households with similar assets but different risk responses might experience 
different outcomes. For example, a drought and the resulting income losses might lead to 
poverty of one farmer’s household. If the same household had obtained a crop insurance, 
it would not be vulnerable to the negative outcome.  
 
The dynamic nature of risk and risk response co-determines together with the asset-base 
of a household which consequences one particular shock has on its welfare
5. Vulnerabil-
ity is thus the forward-looking state of expected outcomes, which are in themselves de-
termined by the magnitude, timing and history of risks and the risk responses. 
 
                                                 
4 The most common threshold that is used in this respect is the poverty threshold. This implies that if the 
hazard is large enough to shift households into poverty, these households are (together with poor house-
holds) considered to be vulnerable to the outcome.  
5 The emphasize here is on vulnerable households, however, the same line of argument can be applied to 
individuals, communities, regions or nations.  11 
1.1.3   Optimal vulnerability reduction 
 
As has been mentioned earlier, poor households are usually constrained in their choice of 
risk management instruments, among them SP interventions, which enhances their vul-
nerability to adverse outcomes caused by shocks, a vulnerability which in turn enhances 
their susceptibility to (future) shocks: while poor households might be able to mitigate or 
cope with a risk or a set of risks at a given period in time, the process can result in limited 
ability to manage (even the same type of) risks in subsequent periods – especially when 
their assets are degraded (see Siegel and Alwang, 1999). Thus, helping the poor to better 
manage risks – as is one aim of SP (see section 1.1) – will reduce their vulnerability, help 
them to escape poverty, and, in a dynamic process, prevent poverty.   
 
There are no general rules that a priori determine which risk management strategies, 
among them SP interventions, are preferable over others. Rather, the search for the opti-
mal vulnerability reduction has to take account both of (a) the magnitude, timing and his-
tory of risks, and (b) the risk responses taken (which in themselves depend on the avail-
ability of and the access to risk management instruments).  
 
While ex ante measures allow to eliminate or reduce risk, lower risk exposure, and miti-
gate against the expected loss (see also Graph 1), ex post risk management can only re-
spond to the realized loss. This suggests that ex ante measures might be preferable to ex 
post measures. However, risk mitigation as an ex ante risk response only provides com-
pensation for losses after the household is impacted by a risky event. Moreover, compen-
sation for losses is usually less than the actual losses suffered – so households often need 
to resort to coping strategies to compensate for remaining losses. Also, risk mitigation 
might prevent a household from falling below the poverty line in a given period, but 
might increase household vulnerability in the future. For example, while unemployment 
insurance mitigates against (a part of) the income loss related to a job loss, the insurance 
contributions decrease the assets of a household which could restrict their choices with 
regard to the management of other and/or future risks.  
 
If a household decides to mitigate or cope with a risk, a variety of different instruments is 
available – all of which have different welfare effects, and might increase or decrease 
vulnerability over time. For example, one strategy to cope with an income loss caused by 
a risky event (e.g., unemployment, death of the breadwinner) is to take children out of 
school to lower household expenditures. This response might increase their vulnerability 
with regard to future risks, while a different coping response, e.g., public assistance, to-
gether with a forward-looking mitigation strategy for future risks, e.g., insurance, might 
have enabled them to better manage risks, and reduced their vulnerability. 
 
Will l owering risk exposure or reducing downward risks produce better outcomes in 
terms of reduced vulnerability than mitigation or coping strategies? Not necessarily. In 
the long run, households should be encouraged to take risks, rather than prevent them. 
Taking risks, and indeed high-stake risks, is a necessary precondition for growth. Thus, 
while risk reduction might decrease vulnerability that comes from risk, it might at the 
same time be an obstacle to increasing growth and welfare.  12 
The selection of the optimal mixture of risk responses to reduce vulnerability, which does 
not hamper development and growth, also has to take account of the many inter-linkages 
between different types of risk management strategies and instruments. To name but one 
example: the literature on insurance (e.g., Williams et al., 1995) suggests moral hazard 
behavior (see section 1.2.1) when compensation, such as insurance benefits, is granted in 
case of a loss. While mitigation instruments thus reduce the vulnerability of people to 
risk, this type of risk response might influence their behavior in a way that leads to in-
creased risk exposure (and thus an insurance failure). For example, individuals who ob-
tain an accident insurance, might tend to become less careful to related risks, and indeed 
increase their exposure because they will be compensated against the expected loss. 
 
While there are no general rules on which risk management strategies are preferable over 
others, there are also no rules that determine which arrangement of actors is preferable. 
The optimal choice of actors, levels of intervention and formality depends on the charac-
teristics of the risk, the characteristics of the “thing” (i.e., asset stock, income flow) at 
risk, and the web of formal and informal risk management practices (Siegel et al., 2001).  
 
Risk management actions taken at higher institutional levels may lower or increase risk 
or strengthen or weaken risk management capability at lower levels: E.g., choices on 
economic policy by the government can increase or decrease the employment risk of in-
dividuals. Investments at higher levels often can better enable institutions at lower levels 
to respond to and manage risks. For instance, international disaster relief programs help 
households cope with risks, and disaster preparedness programs r educe exposure of 
communities and households to risks. Thus, the optimal risk management practice de-
pends on alternatives at different levels and their costs, and indeed will often be a combi-
nation of several instruments, provided by several actors. For example, the management 
of health risks could be enhanced by micro-health insurance, and/or by expanded sanita-
tion coverage, improved immunization, community health education, etc. – all actions 
provided by a variety of actors and at a variety of levels. In general, an involvement of all 
stakeholders in risk management (individuals, households, the civil society NGOs, mar-
ket-based and public institutions) might provide comparative advantages. Clearly, this 
requires coordination and collaboration between these actors to make sure that their 
strategies complement each other, and that potential synergies are utilized.  
 
While it is sometimes arbitrary to decide which risk responses by which actors best re-
duce vulnerabilities of households over time, the role of the public sector in risk man-
agement is key (Devarajan and Hammer, 1998). Governments can, for example, provide 
very cost-effective risk reduction, e.g., by providing laws and regulations (e.g., regula-
tions against child labor, laws against discrimination, etc.), or through information and 
education campaigns (e.g., through HIV/AIDS awareness programs, etc.). The role of 
governments is, however, often ambiguous. On the one hand, they might lack an active 
role in risk management, and, for example, not provide formal safety nets. On the other 
hand, the provision of formal safety nets might actually crowd out alternative household 
risk management practices (e.g., risk reduction or mitigation), because the household 
might think it can depend on the government, donors or NGOs to help them in times of 
crisis. While interventions from the public sector thus have to follow some kind of ra-13 
tionale (see section 1.2) – not least to prevent crowding out of private initiative – many 
vulnerable households might not be able to afford the “luxury” of devoting scarce re-
sources to risk reduction or mitigation – and thus depend on interventions of the public 
sector. 
 
The following graph summarizes the principal framework laid out above. Downward 
risks, and the exposure to them, lead to adverse outcomes, leaving households more vul-
nerable than before, and less equipped to manage future risks. To reduce this vulnerabil-
ity, risk responses have to be optimized. Ex ante, i.e., before the shock hits, risks can be 
eliminated or reduced, risk exposure can be lowered, and measures can be taken to miti-
gate the expected loss, if the risk were to occur (e.g., through insurance). Ex post, i.e., af-
ter the shock has hit, coping with the outcome is an option of risk management.  
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Source: Heitzmann et al., 2001: Graph 1. 
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1.2  Public expenditures: Rationales for public interventions 
 
Public interventions play a major role in risk management. It needs to be emphasized 
though that the mere existence of risk does not necessitate public intervention. Rather, 
many risks can best be managed by private formal or informal mechanisms. Against the 
background of scarce public resources, and high opportunity costs, it is crucial to exam-
ine the appropriate role of the state in risk management, and thus in SP. For example, 
rather than crowding out private actions, public resources might be of better use for man-
aging risks that the private sectors will not or not sufficiently cover.  
 
In order to assess the appropriate role of the government, the need for, and the limitations 
of, government action have to be examined. Economic theory provides valuable guidance 
in this respect: market failure (section 1.2.1) and distributional equity (1.2.2) are two fre-
quent justifications for government intervention. In many instances, rather hybrid ration-
ales, such as culture, tradition, or solidarity (section 1.2.3) also explain why the public 
sector intervenes (or why it does not). While all these rationales provide justifications for 
public intervention, the capabilities of the state are in practice often as important determi-
nants of, and constraints to, public action (Belli et al., 1998).  
 
1.2.1  Market failure  
 
When a market economy fails to allocate resources efficiently, market failure occurs. 
This is especially the case with regard to public goods, externalities, competition failures 
asymmetric information and missing markets (see, for example, Belli et al., 1998). In the 
context of risk, markets are often characterized by a risk market failure. For example, the 
existence of risk in general implies the demand for insurance. For reasons of adverse se-
lection and moral hazard, however, an insurance market will fail to emerge (i.e., simply 
does not exist) or supply insurance in far less than optimal amounts (Devarajan and 
Hammer, 1998).  
 
Adverse selection occurs if there is asymmetric information in the market place. Take 
health insurance as an example: demanders of health insurance in general know more 
about their health status than the insurer does. Thus, insurance companies generally offer 
health insurance at a price that is based on the average risk of the population. At that 
price, however, only those with a higher-than average risk will purchase insurance – leav-
ing the insurance company with a population group that is riskier than it expected. If the 
company would raise the price for the insurance, however, even more people left the 
market, i.e., would not buy insurance at the given price, and eventually the market dried 
up (Devarajan and Hammer, 1998).  
 
Moral hazard describes a situation where a person that has obtained insurance, may have 
an incentive to undertake sub-optimal levels of risk-reducing activities. For instance, pur-
chasers of a fire insurance might not take all the necessary precautions to prevent a fire 
from breaking out, even though society would be better off, if they did. If insurance mar-
kets are thus distorted – or don’t exist at all – public intervention might be considered.  
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It is impossible to judge a priori what type of government intervention is appropriate to a 
particular market failure. Such judgments are both country– and situation–specific and 
must be made on a case–by–case basis (Belli et al., 1998). Moreover, whether or not gov-
ernments should actually intervene depends on whether they could do better than the 
private market. For example, empirical studies provided evidence that public crop insur-
ance was as ineffective as private crop insurance – mainly because of moral hazard prob-
lems. This implies that if the government can not do better than private institutions, there 
might be no reason for it to intervene; the  free market allocation is “constrained Pareto-
optimal”
6 (Devarajan and Hammer, 1998). Contrary, public intervention in an (undis-
torted) market can be justified, if this is a way to address a failure in a distorted market 
(“second-best approach”, Devarajan and Hammer, 1998). For example, if a failure in the 
credit market prevents young people from obtaining student loans, then public support to 
education may be justified. It is vital though that the market in which interventions are 
being considered is linked to a truly distorted market. Moreover, removing the original 
distortion must be more difficult or costly than this “second-best” approach.  
 
In addition to risk market failure, various other market failures might justify public inter-
ventions (see Belli et al., 1998). The existence of externalities is a good case in point. For 
example, education provides positive social externalities, i.e., benefits not only to the in-
dividual who obtains education, but a larger group. There is empirical evidence that being 
literate and numerate leads to “good citizenship” and lessens crime. Educated women 
usually have fewer children, they provide better family nutrition, and are more likely to 
use public health facilities etc. Thus, (primary) education has a compelling rationale for 
public intervention.  
 
Also the existence of asymmetric information can justify public interventions. For exam-
ple, many people tend to underestimate the value of preventive health care measures, 
such as immunization services, health, nutrition and family planning education services. 
Thus, these services tend to be undersupplied by the market. Consequently, public health 
measures could be supplied by the public sector.  
 
1.2.2   Redistribution 
 
An important case for public interventions can be made in terms of improving distribu-
tional outcomes (Litpon and Ravallion, 1993). Without public action, equity might be 
underprovided, which is of particular relevance for poverty reduction. Among the distri-
butional objectives of public spending is thus the promotion of pro-poor growth. FGov-
ernments have, for example, a role to play in the provision of certain types of physical 
and human infrastructure that would otherwise be underprovided, to ensure that economic 
growth fully includes those among the poor who are capable of participating. Moreover, 
governments have to assist those left behind during the process of economic growth. It 
may take a long time for some sub-groups in society to participate in economic growth. 
Some groups, e.g., the elderly and disabled, may indeed never participate directly. Fur-
thermore, public interventions can help deal with vulnerability. Incomes can be highly 
                                                 
6 Rather, governments might provide relevant regulations to deal with moral hazard behavior, e.g.. force all 
people to insure against a risk (as is done in many countries with a pension system).  16 
variable over time, particularly in poor rural economies, where consumption smoothing is 
also imperfect. So, the poor can be particularly vulnerable to uninsured risk caused by 
uncertain weather, relative price shifts or the collapse of community-level support sys-
tems during a crisis. Moreover, they are likely to be disadvantaged in terms of access to 
and utilization of services (Fozzard et al., 2001:21).  
 
Many governments thus intervene in the market to adjust for unequal distributions of in-
come, access to services, opportunities or outcomes, and to achieve a more equal distribu-
tion. Targeting benefits is a common method to achieve these goals (see Subbarao et al., 
1997, Grosh, 1994).   
  
1.2.3   Other rationales for public intervention 
 
In many instances, public interventions are neither based exclusively on market failure 
nor on equity considerations, but include tradition, values, solidarity, etc. While these ra-
tionales might only partially justify public interventions from an economic point of view, 
governments may want to intervene following these rationales in order to maintain social 
peace and stability. For example, many social sector interventions in OECD countries are 
based on the principle of solidarity. Not only the poor but also the non-poor receive so-
cial benefits and free services (e.g., universal family benefits, care allowances, free edu-
cation etc.). This system guarantees that the solidarity of the non-poor, and thus the sus-
tainability of financing social sector activities, as they receive some benefits as an ex-
change for their (comparatively high) contribution rates (e.g., social security taxes). 
 
Also tradition might be a rationale for the public sector to intervene in undistorted mar-
kets. This can be based on historical reasons. For example, free fertilizer has traditionally 
been provided to farmers in many African countries. While these public interventions 
might have been justified in earlier decades (e.g., for equity reasons), they would no 
longer be necessary. As many of their voters are farmers, however, governments are re-
luctant to abolish this type of intervention (and lose elections).  
 
Also values, norms and beliefs often are rationales for government interventions (or the 
lack thereof). These rationales explain why governments were, for example, for a long 
time reluctant to take on an active role in combating HIV/AIDS. Moreover, if women are 
believed to be less worthy than men, governments might not obtain a role to adjust for 
unequal outcomes based on gender discrimination.  
 
After having discussed the main conceptual underpinnings for a SP expenditure, per-
formance and finance review, the following sections are concerned with providing some 
guidance on how to carry out such a review.    
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2.   Scope and structure of SP interventions 
 
In the developing world the role of social sector expenditures in shaping the development 
process has become increasingly important. Policymakers need up-to-date information on 
their scope, composition and structure to answer questions such as how much is spent, on 
what, by whom and for whom. Otherwise it is extremely difficult to mobilize resources or 
address issues of efficiency and equity through the budget in countries with tight fiscal 
constraints.  
 
This section aims to assist analysts in identifying and classifying SP interventions of a 
country. Section 2.1 will – after recapitulating of the definition of social protection – 
identify which interventions have to be considered in this respect. In section 2.2. we pro-
vide some proposals on how to meaningfully classify SP i nterventions  – against the 
background of the social risk management framework (see section 1.1.1).  
 
 
2.1   Identification of SP interventions  
 
As has been elaborated above (see section 1.1), SP interventions include actions to (i) as-
sist individuals, households, and communities to better manage risk, and (ii) provide sup-
port to the critically poor (World Bank, 2001a:9). A country’s SP framework will include 
a set of laws and regulations and a set of expenditure programs. In addition, private 
mechanisms – both market-based and informal – provide important support. Indeed, less 
than a quarter of the world’s population has access to formal social protection programs 
(World Bank, 2001a:9). The significance of informal arrangements as compared to for-
mal private an public arrangements is, for example, evidenced in Togo, where 95% of the 
population rely on informal instruments to manage risk (Bendokat and Tovo, 1999:13).  
 
The combination of all policies, norms, and programs represents the overall SP strategy 
of a country. To understand the appropriateness and success of these interventions in 
managing risk and providing support to the critically poor, all these aspects of a country’s 
SP strategy have to be taken into account
7. 
 
Thus, as a first step of a comprehensive SP expenditure, performance and finance review, 
analysts are required to provide an inventory of existing SP interventions in a country. 
The information gathered does not have to be in very much detail, but should allow for a 
broad overview of which interventions are available (and which are not). It is important  
that this inventory is as comprehensive as possible, and includes SP interventions (i.e., 
policies, laws, regulations, programs
8) from all actors (see also section 1.1.2), most nota-
                                                 
7 The requirement to identify private formal and informal activities usually does not form part of a public 
expenditure review (except for the discussion of the rationale for public expenditures). Rather, PERs tend 
to narrowly focus on the government budget, while hardly considering the provision and finance of inter-
ventions of private actors, which do not feature in budgets and seldom appear in efficiency studies. This 
negligence, however, makes it difficult to reconsider targets, or reform the fiscal sustainability of essential 
public programs in SP. 
8 According to Pradhan (1996:6) “a program as a set of expenditures within or across a sector with rela-
tively homogeneous benefits constitutes a useful unit of analysis” for the classification of expenditures. 18 
bly the public sector, market-based organizations, and the informal sector (i.e., individu-
als, households, and communities). 
 




Labor market interventions: Improve the ability of households to provide for themselves through work 
via the development of efficient and fair labor policies, active and passive labor market programs, and pre- 
and in-service training programs. 
 
Pensions: Help governments take care of their older and aging populations by creating or improving pri-
vate pension provisions, mandatory savings, and public old-age income support schemes. Governments 
intervene heavily in both regulation and expenditure in this area. 
 
Social safety nets: Provide income support and access to basic social services to the poorest population 
groups, and/or those needing assistance after economic downturns, natural disasters, or household-specific 
adverse events that lower income. 
 
Child-labor reduction programs: Promote the development of human capital and increase equity and 
education for all groups by designing comprehensive strategies for broadly based poverty reduction, and 
craft appropriate legislation and programs specifically for child laborers to reduce the occurrence and miti-
gate the risks of harmful child labor. 
 
Disability programs: Help the disabled through community-based services, including family support (res-
pite care, child care, counseling, home visiting, domestic violence counseling, alcohol treatment and reha-
bilitation), support for people with disabilities (inclusive education, sheltered workshops, rehabilitation, 
technical aids), help for the elderly (senior citizen centers, home visits), and out-of-home placements (foster 
care, adoption). 
 
Social funds: Through agencies, channel grant funding to small-scale projects to help poor communities 
design and implement their own projects to meet their self-defined needs. 
 
Private Formal Actions 
 
Market transactions: Private markets can provide insurance policies for health and physical assets, pen-
sion plans for retirement and vehicles for saving in good times and obtaining credit when needed. 
 
Private Informal Actions 
 
Informal arrangements:  Support community or family members through informal insurance arrange-
ments. Arrangements can include marriage, children, mutual community support, savings or investment in 
human, physical, and real assets, and investment in social capital (rituals, reciprocal gift giving). 
 
Source: adopted from Coudouel et al., 2001a: Box 1, pg. 1f. 
 
In Annex 1 we provide a template (Template 1) that will assist analysts in quickly identi-
fying SP interventions in a country classified by the arrangement of the providers of these 
interventions, i.e., public, private formal and informal interventions. In Box 4, some ex-
amples of SP activities, which analysts will have to identify, are provided (for more pro-
grams, and “best-practice examples”, see also Technical Note 2, Stylized Summary of 
Program Characteristics and Good Practices, in Coudouel et al., 2001b:12ff.).  19 
 
With regard to public interventions, analysts, who carry out this part of the assessment, 
have to be aware of the fact that SP has a peculiar characteristic of being covered by mul-
tiple ministries, and many expenditures incurred by the ministries of finance, infrastruc-
ture, agriculture, etc. are relevant to the outcomes of SP interventions. Thus, analysts 
have to make sure that they capture all interventions relevant for SP, not only those 
housed under the ministry of social welfare
9. To assists analysts in their work, we provide 
some examples of SP interventions, and their potential links to different ministries, in 
Box 5.  
 
Box 5: Examples of public social protection programs and policies and their links to 
sector ministry budgets 
 
Social Programs 
§  Social funds – Social Welfare (SW), Infrastructure (In), Presidency, Planning, Agriculture (Ag) 
§  Family assistance – Planning, SW, Finance, 
§  Employment legislation: hiring and firing rules (including severance), contracting for labor,  
 mini mum wages,   etc. –  Labor, SW,  
§  Unemployment assistance – Labor, SW 
§  Job search assistance – Labor, SW 
§  Unemployment insurance – Labor, SW 
§  Job retraining programs – Labor, SW, Education 
§  Integrated savings account – Labor, SW, Finance 
§  Health insurance – Health 
 
Food Programs 
§  Food for work/labor intensive public works – Labor, SW, In, Transportation (Tr) 
§  Food price subsidies – Ag, Finance 
§  Food rations – SW, Ag, Planning, Finance 
§  Food stamps – SW, Ag, Planning, Finance 
§  School feeding programs – Education, Health, SW 
 
Other Welfare Schemes 
§  Agricultural input subsidies (prices or vouchers) – Ag, Finance 
§  Energy subsidies – Energy, Finance, Ag, Tr 
§  Housing subsidies – Housing, SW 
§  School fee-waivers/scholarships – Education, SW 
§  Needs based cash social assistance – SW, Finance 
§  Pensions rules and expenditures (contributory and non-contributory) – Finance, SW, Labor 
 
Source: Canagarajah et al., 2001, Box 2, pg. 8   
 
Moreover, analysts have to ensure that they include all significant public programs and 
interventions of all levels of government  – namely national, regional/provincial, dis-
trict/local etc. In Annex 1 we provide a template that will allow to identify public inter-
ventions accordingly (see Template 2). 
 
                                                 
9 In the past, many studies which addressed expenditure issues of the public sector in the past have been 
executed along narrow sectoral ‘silos’, often identical with a specific ministry’s budget. 20 
Important information sources with regard to public interventions, are macro-level analy-
ses of federal as well as regional and local budgets. However, efforts in the past to define 
and systematically record such expenditures have not been very successful (see Box 6) – 
both regarding federal budgets, let alone regional and local budgets. Past expenditure re-
views have also indicated that countries follow different conventions in classifying ex-
penditures, and hence analyses based on such data may not only be not-comparable be-
tween countries but also incorrect.
10 
 
Box 6: Past Experiences with Social Security Statistics 
 
ILO’s resolution in 1957 to develop social security statistics was a welcome initiative. However, as experi-
ence has shown the limited operational incentives for country authorities have made the progress on im-
plementing the resolution extremely difficult, if not impossible. The compilation of such statistics from 
countries has not been forthcoming without additional work by the ILO. Even then the exercise to date has 
proven to be too incomplete to be useful for policy purposes. On the basis of that earlier initiative ILO 
adopted the International inquiry on the “Cost of Social Security” initiative in December 1997 which could 
serve as an effective tool in the design and analysis of social security programs around the world. However, 
one major concern that is unresolved is what new incentives there are for countries to implement this initia-
tive when past efforts have not been fully implemented. The important key to sustaining these efforts is to 
internalize this process within the country such that it is done systematically when the annual budget prepa-
ration and review exercises are carried out. The IMF GFS Manual (2001) has made amendments to its 1986 
manual to reflect social protection issues, but a lot needs to be done before it can be more than a wish list. 
In this regard it will be useful to engage in a discussion with relevant stakeholders on the modalities of im-
plementation to ensure that this is, indeed, sustainable. Also, we may want to critically review the classifi-
cation in “ESSPROS” and “IMF GFS” before they are implemented in the developing world as they will 
form the basis for a system of SP statistics in most countries. 
 
Source: Canagarajah et al., 2001: Box 3, pg. 12 
 
A further problem with regard to data on public expenditures is that the technical capa-
bilities of monitoring and recording information in many countries are missing (see sec-
tion 4.1). Also, the extent of individual capabilities to record and handle relevant data is 
often limited. Shortcomings in both types of capabilities clearly will decrease the value of 
this exercise. If these capabilities are limited or indeed missing, outputs will be modest. 
Thus, in the long run it will be necessary to improve both types of capabilities within po-
tential study countries, as it will otherwise remain difficult to examine the relations be-
tween inputs and outputs of SP programs and interventions. Analysts carrying out this 
part of the review are required to document both information needs and demand in terms 
of technical and human capital capabilities.  
 
As mentioned before (see section 1.1), SP interventions differ from many other sectors, 
as provision and finance often are provided by different actors. For example, while the 
public sector might administer insurance programs, those entitled to benefits have to pay 
contributions. Similarly, while private organizations provide many social services, the 
public sector often finances these services together with the demanders of these services. 
To account for these differences in provision and finance, analysts have to gather some 
information not only on who provides (see Template 1 and 2), but also on who finances 
                                                 
10 Recent OECD/ILO work on social security statistics has been effective in rationalizing social welfare 
interventions in many countries. 21 
what part of the SP interventions identified. In Annex 1 we provide a quick checklist that 
will assist analysts in the conduct of this exercise
11 (see Template 3).  
 
 
2.2   Classification of SP interventions 
 
After having identified (the provision and finance of) SP interventions, analysts will have 
to classify them. We propose to apply two “lenses” to categorize SP interventions: First, 
against the background of the risk management framework (see section 1.1), the impor-
tance of distinguishing between ex ante (risk reduction, lowering risk exposure, risk miti-
gation) and ex post risk management instruments (coping) has been discussed (see Box 
2). Thus, SP interventions should be classified accordingly (see section 2.2.1). Secondly, 
based on the conventions of public expenditure reviews (Pradhan, 1996), we propose to 
classify interventions according to their functions (see section 2.2.2).  
 
2.2.1    Classification of SP interventions by risk management strategies 
 
As has been discussed previously (see section 1.1.2), risk management instruments, 
among them SP interventions, can be differentiated into ex ante and ex post instruments. 
To understand the focus of the existing SP framework, analysts have to identify which 
part of the “risk chain” (see Box 1) is addressed by each of the SP interventions. For ex-
ample, in general labor market programs or policies (as well as other SP policies and 
regulations) aim to reduce risks or lower risk exposure. Insurance type programs (e.g., 
disability, survivor’s sickness, old-age insurance) are typical mitigation programs, and 
assistance type programs (e.g., food programs, public works) are typically coping strate-
gies.  
 
2.2.2   Classification of SP interventions by functions 
 
There are many more different possibilities on how one might structure an inventory of 
interventions. One possibility is to structure SP interventions according to their functions, 
as is, for example, proposed in the standard accounting recording format of the revised 
Government Finance Statistics of the IMF (IMF, 2001). The GFS can – together with 
other sources, e.g., the European System of Integrated Social Protection Statistics 
(ESSPROS), or the Costs of Social Security Statistics of the ILO (1997) – also serve as a 
primary data source for reviewing public expenditures on SP on a macro level (see also 
Box 6).  
 
The functional classification in the revised GFS system (IMF, 2001: Ch. 6) classifies data 
according to the purpose for which an expense was incurred. The functions attributed to 
social protection expenditures are essentially (i) sickness and disability, (ii) old-age, (iii) 
                                                 
11 A more detailed analysis of the finance of SP interventions (by the types of the revenues) is provided for 
specific programs in section 4.2.  22 




These two types of classifying SP interventions will make it possible to see (i) for what 
types of risk management strategies expenditures have incurred, and (ii) for which func-
tions. Analysts are required to classify the interventions they have identified previously 
(see section 2.1) accordingly, ideally by including information on the providers of the SP 
interventions. Box 7 provides an illustrative example of how such a multilevel classifica-
tion of SP interventions could look like, classified by (i) functions (sickness and disabil-
ity, old-age, survivor, family and children, unemployment, housing, and other), (ii) dif-
ferent types of risk management strategies (risk reduction, risk mitigation and coping), 
and (iii) levels of formality of the providers.  
 
Moreover, Annex 2a contains a country example carried out in Togo as part of an analy-
sis to adopt a social protection strategy for the country (Bendokat and Tovo, 1999). 
There, social protection and other interventions have been classified according to their 
type of risk management strategy and their arrangement. 
                                                 
12 In many countries, however, data on SP is summarized under a single category only, i.e., comprising 
social services and welfare. Thus, whenever possible, a  further differentiation of SP interventions into 
functional categories will allow to enhance transparency in terms of classifying SP expenditures to specific 
functions.  





Risk prevention and lowering risk 
exposure 
(e.g., policies, regulations) 
Risk mitigation 
(e.g., insurance type programs) 
Risk coping 
(e.g., assistance type programs) 
Sickness and disability  Public:  awareness programs (e.g., 
HIV/AIDS), public health programs,  
policies on labor market integration 
for the sick/disabled, regulations on 
safety at work and at home 
 
Private formal: safety regulations in 
companies 
 
Private informal: sickness preventive 
behavior 
  
Public:  health insurance, disability pen-
sion insurance, care allowances, pub-
lic health facilities, savings accounts 
 
Private formal: private insurance for 
health/disability, insurance against 
accidents 
 
Private informal: savings, building so-
cial capital 
Public: support in cash or kind for sick 
and household members, provision of 
emergency centers, hospitals, social 
assistance  
 
Private formal: hospitals 
 
Private informal: providing care, ex-
change of labor between households, 
reliance on children, taking credit, dis-
saving 
Old age  Public: anti-discrimination regulation, 
regulatory framework for private 
pension programs 
 
Private informal: sickness preventive 
behavior 
Public: Pension insurance, savings ac-
counts 
 
Private formal: private pension plans 
 
Private informal: savings, building so-
cial capital 
Public: minimum pension payments, 
social assistance 
 
Private formal: providing credit 
 
Private informal: providing care, reli-
ance on children, taking credit, dis-
saving 
 
Survivors  Public: regulation on inheritance (anti-
discrimination of women and chil-
dren), property rights for women 
  
Public: survivors’ insurance, savings 
accounts 
 
Private formal: private survivors’ insur-
ance, savings 
 
Private informal: employment of female 
partner, building social capital 
 
Public: social assistance 
 
Private formal: providing credit 
 
Private informal: reliance on children, 
taking credit, dis-saving 24 
Family and children  Public: Regulations against child labor; 
against gender discrimination; equal 
rights regulations; education, school 
feeding programs, school fee waiv-
ers, scholarships, etc, 
 
Public: Family allowances, savings ac-
counts 
 
Private formal: private insurance for 
life,  
 
Private informal: saving 
Public: food stamps, food rations, social 
assistance, school feeding programs, 
 
Private formal: providing credit 
 
Private informal: child fostering, reli-
ance on children, taking credit, dis-
saving 
Unemployment  Public: employment regulation (hire and 
fire policies, minimum wage regula-
tions, etc.), job training programs 
 
Private formal: job training programs 
 
Private informal: migration, education 
Public: unemployment insurance, job 
search programs 
 
Private formal: providing saving plans 
 
Private informal: saving 
Public: emergency relief benefits, job 
search assistance, social assistance 
 
Private formal: providing credit 
 
Private informal: reliance on children, 
taking credit, dis-saving, migration 
Housing  Private formal: regulation 
 
 
Public: housing benefits 
 
Private formal: providing saving plans, 
microfinance 
 
Private informal: savings 
Public: Housing subsidies, social assis-
tance 
 
Private formal: providing credit 
 
Private informal: reliance on children, 
taking credit, dis-saving 
Other 
 
…  …  … 
Source: Authors 
 
  3.   Indicators to monitor the adequacy and success of SP interven-
tions 
 
After having identified (and classified) SP interventions according to their functions, ar-
rangements and risk management strategies, it needs to be assessed in how far they are 
meaningful, and successful, in (i) helping the poor better manage risk, and/or (ii) in pro-
viding help to the critically poor (see definition of SP, section 1.1). As has been discussed 
earlier, social protection attempts to not only cope with the symptoms of poverty (i.e., 
outcomes, see Graph 1), but also to address the causes of poverty (i.e., risk exposure and 
– ineffective – risk responses). Thus, an assessment of the adequacy and success of the 
existing SP framework requires to examine both, outcomes and risk exposure. A confron-
tation of these demand-side aspects with the existing supply of SP instruments (section 
3.3) will allow to get a primary indication of the overall effectiveness of the SP system – 
and provide preliminary information on potential gaps and shortcomings of the existing 
system
13. In what follows, we provide some proposals on how analysts might examine 
outcomes (section 3.1) and risks/risk exposure (section 3.2).  
 
 
3.1   Monitoring the effectiveness of SP interventions in helping the critically 
poor: assessment of outcomes 
 
One of the objectives of SP is to help the critically poor (see section 1.1). This implies 
that SP interventions have to improve adverse outcomes, such as to lower poverty, to 
lower unemployment rates, to decrease child labor, improve the situation of the disabled, 
etc. In order to do so, and thus to monitor the overall success of current SP interventions, 
indicators that reflect current levels of these outcomes have to be identified, and routinely 
measured. 
 
Analysts entrusted with this part of the assessment thus have to select – in close collabo-
ration with country- and sector experts – outcome indicators that are meaningful with re-
spect to country-specifics (see also section 4.1). Many examples of relevant indicators are 
available, such as the core outcome indicators of the international development goals, 
which are derived from a series of UN conferences held in the 1990s. They reflect key 
aspects of economic and social well-being and environmental sustainability (see Box 8). 
The advantage of these indicators is not only that they are internationally accepted, but 
also that data is readily available for most of our client countries (e.g., in various ESW 




                                                 
13 As has been discussed previously (see section 1.1), risks and risk management comprise many areas 
which often can not be (solely or at all) addressed by SP interventions. For example, many inter-linkages 
exist between the social sectors which require a joint analysis of all these sectors to meaningful assess the 
progress of the risk management system in a country (see Canagarajah et al., 2001).  26 
Box 8: Measuring outcomes - Core indicators derived from the international devel-
opment goals 
 
Indicators   
Economic well-being   
   1. Incidence of extreme poverty: Population below $1 per day   
   2. Poverty gap ratio: Incidence times depth of poverty   
   3. Inequality: Poorest fifth’s share of national consumption   
   4. Child malnutrition: Prevalence of underweight under 5s   
Social development   
   5. Net enrolment in primary education   
   6. Completion of 4
th grade of primary education   
   7. Literacy rate of 15 to 24 year-olds   
   8. Ratio of girls to boys in primary and secondary education   
   9. Ratio of literate females to males (15 to 24 year-olds)    
   10. Infant mortality rate   
   11. Under 5 mortality rate   
   12. Maternal mortality rate   
   13. Births attended by skilled health personnel   
   14. Contraceptive prevalence rate   
   15. HIV prevalence in 15 to 24 year-old pregnant women   
Environmental sustainability and regeneration   
   16. Countries with effective processes for sustainable development   
   17. Population with (sustainable) access to safe water   
   18. Forest area as a % of national surface area   
   19. Biodiversity: Land area protected   
   20. Energy efficiency: GDP per unit of energy use   
   21. Carbon dioxide emissions (kg per PPP % of GDP)   
General indicators   
   GNP per capita   
   Adult literacy rate   
   Total fertility rate   
   Life expectancy at birth   
   Aid as % of GNP   
   External debt as % of GNP   
   Investment as % of GDP   
   Trade as % of GDP 
 
Source: based on the working set of core indicators derived from the international 
development goals, selected from the series of UN conferences held in the 1990s. 
 
 
Coudouel et al. (2001a) elaborated SP specific outcome indicators that are presented in 
Box 9. Analysts can use these indicators as a starting point for their assessment. Clearly, 
the lists of outcome indicators provided in Boxes 8 and 9 are by no means comprehen-
sive, but need to be adopted to the specifics of the countries assessed (as well as to con-
straints in terms of the data availability
14). Ideally, all main stakeholders in the country 
                                                 
14 The main drawback to this exercise will actually be the lack of relevant data on the desired indicators. 
Thus, in many instances it will be necessary to rely on second-best indicators or guesstimates based on 
suggestions of country- and sector-experts or country officials. Moreover, analysts have to make sure that 
the outcome indicators chosen are meaningful with regard to the country-specifics. For example, unem-
ployment rate usually only covers those that have formally been employed in the formal sector, i.e., a small 27 
should agree upon the country-specific indicators selected, as this provides the basis for a 
broadly accepted benchmark against which the effectiveness and success of SP interven-
tions in a country can be examined over time. 
 
Box 9: Outcome indicators in social protection 
 
•  Poverty headcount and depth, if possible disaggregate by rural/urban and, ideally, by different po-
tentially vulnerable groups, including the elderly and widows 
•  Levels of chronic versus transient poverty (again disaggregated, even approximately, for different 
potentially vulnerable groups) 
•  Prevalence of seasonal hunger 
•  Distress sales of livestock or land 
•  Child malnutrition rates 
•  Unemployment rates and estimates of underemployment, capturing the level of formalization or 
informalization in the labor market (by age and gender) 
•  Primary-school dropout rate (for boys and girls) 
•  Incidence of child labor (percent of children who work, based on age and gender) 
•  Hours worked by children 
•  Labor market situation for vulnerable groups (youth, women) 
•  Estimated percent of children or families left vulnerable or destitute as a result of communicable 
diseases (indicators for AIDS, for example, might include number of infected, number of infirmi-
ties, estimated number of orphans) 
 
Source: Coudouel et al., 2001a: Box 3, pg. 8 
 
It is important to recognize that final outcome indicators (e.g., poverty rates) are often ill 
equipped for a sector analysis
15, as many factors that determine these outcomes are out-
side the realm of SP. For example, macroeconomic policies, political decisions, terms of 
trade shocks, natural disasters as well institutional and human capacities, etc. might coun-
teract the impacts SP interventions have with regard to a certain outcome. For example, 
labor market policies targeted to enhance labor force participation in a country might 
have little impact as long as the country faces unstable economic conditions. In a situa-
tion of stable economic growth, however, they might be very effective. Thus, rather than 
measuring labor force participation, analysts might want to identify indicators that more 
closely reflect the outputs of specific SP policies or programs, e.g., participation rates in 
labor market training programs, proportions of women integrated in the labor market af-
ter attending retraining programs, etc.  
 
Thus, the selection and measurement of intermediate outcomes (or: program outputs), 
rather than (or in addition to) final outcomes, might prove to be a more meaningful way 
of monitoring the overall adequacy of social protection interventions in helping the criti-
cally poor. Ideally, these intermediate outcome indicators (or: outputs) can be derived 
from the stated objectives of SP policies, from political priorities in SP, from the social 
development factors of the international development goals, etc.  
                                                                                                                                                 
minority of workers in, for example, many African countries, which limits the significance of this indicator 
considerably. 
15 Empirical evidence for the weak links between sectoral programs and final outcomes has, for example, 
been provided for health (Filmer et al., 1998). 28 
 
To provide but some examples of outcome and output indicators: While infant morality 
rate is an outcome indicator, the proportion of children immunized is an intermediate out-
come indicator. Similarly, while enhancing education is a primary aim, which can be 
measured by a final outcome indicator, the proportion of children enrolled in first year 
schooling is an output indicator more closely linked to specific social programs. For fur-
ther examples of intermediate and final outcome indicators, see Box 10. 
 
Box 10: Examples of final and intermediate indicators 
 
Goal  Intermediate indicator 
(input and output) 
Final indicator 
(outcome and impact) 
Reduce extreme poverty and ex-
pand economic opportunities for 
the poor. 
• Expenditure on infrastructure  
• Expenditure on and number of 
beneficiaries of job training 
programs  
• Percentage of roads in good 
and fair condition 
• Incidence of extreme poverty: 
percentage of population 
whose consumption falls be-
low the poverty line 
• Poverty gap ratio 
• Income/expenditure of the 
poorest 20% of the population 
as a share of the total in-




• Percentage of the poor popula-
tion with access to microcredit 
programs 
Enhance the capabilities of poor 
men and women 
• Expenditure on primary edu-
cation as a share of national 
income 
• Expenditure on primary 
health care as a share of na-
tional income 
• Percentage of schools in good 
physical condition  
• Pupil-teacher ratio 
• Number of doctors per 
100,000 inhabitants 
• Literacy rates  
• Learning achievement  
• Dropout and repetition rates  
• Net enrollment in primary 
education 
• Percentage of population be-
low the poverty line with ac-
cess to health care facilities 
• Infant, child, and under-five 
mortality rate 
• Maternal mortality rate 
• Malnutrition rate 
 
Reduce the vulnerability of the 
poor 
• Expenditure on safety net 
programs 
• Percentage of poor house-
holds/ individuals receiving 
transfers from the government 
• Variability of household con-
sumption 
• Percentage of AIDS orphans 
protected 
 
Source: Prennushi et al., 2001: Tab 1, pg. 7 
 
To facilitate the conduct of this part of the exercise, and to allow for a systematic data 
collection over years, a template is provided in Annex 1 of this paper (see Template 4). 
Moreover, in section 4.2, when assessing SP programs in more detail, further information 
on the outputs of the program will have to be gathered.  29 
3.2   Monitoring the effectiveness of SP interventions in helping the poor better 
manage risks: assessment of risk and risk exposure 
 
In addition to helping the critically poor, SP interventions aim to help the poor better 
manage risks (see definition of SP, section 1.1.1). Thus, analysts entrusted with carrying 
out an analysis of the effectiveness of the SP system in a country have to take account of 
the risks people face. Downward shocks, together with the risk responses and the asset-
base of households, are important causes of poverty (see Alwang et al., 2001; Heitzmann 
et al., 2001; Holzmann and Jørgensen, 2000; Alwang and Siegel, 1999). 
 
As has been elaborated in the conceptual part of this paper (see section 1.1), every indi-
vidual, household, community or country is e xposed to risks. The poor often are ill 
equipped to respond to these risks which enhances their vulnerability to an adverse out-
come caused by the risk. Enabling the poor to better respond to the risk (i.e., to better 
manage a risk) thus is a promising way of – over time – escaping poverty. However, im-
proving risk management is also a means of sustainably preventing poverty of the non-
poor.  
 
However, what are the risks people face? In what follows, we provide a short guideline 
that will assist analysts carrying out this part of the SP expenditure, performance and fi-
nance review. It is based on a guideline for the conduct of a risk and vulnerability as-
sessment recently elaborated in the World Bank (see Heitzmann et al., 2001). It is impor-
tant to recognize that this part of the guideline usually does not form part of traditional 
PER work in the World Bank. Against the background of the definition of SP, and its 
conceptual background, the social risk management framework, this part of the analysis 
is vital though to understand the needs of the poor and their demand for risk management 
instruments, among them SP interventions (see section 2.1).  
 
3.2.1  Identifying risks and their main characteristics  
 
Analysts entrusted with the conduct of this work have to identify downside shocks, which 
are prevalent in a country. Various country reports will contain relevant information for 
such an inventory, and have to be examined (e.g., poverty assessments, social sector re-
ports, risk assessments, etc.). If time and resources allow, additional data could be col-
lected (e.g., by organizing focus group discussion at grassroot level, or by conducting in-
terviews with key informants, see Bendokat and Tovo, 1999). In Annex 1 we provide a 
template that will assist analysts in taking stock of such risks (Template 5).  
 
It is important that the inventory of risks – which is of course country-specific – is as 
complete as possible, and also includes risks that might receive little attention within the 
country itself, for example due to cultural or ideological reasons. For example, Bendokat 
and Tovo (1999:10f.) identify several risks that are “blind spots” in Togo, among them 
gender discrimination, which is basically perceived as the ‘way things are’, and not ex-
plicitly recognized as a risk that increases the vulnerability of women and children. Simi-
larly, neither the Togolese nor the relevant authorities appear to realize the importance of 
the HIV/AIDS epidemic.  30 
 
In addition to merely identifying risks that are prevalent in a country, it is important to 
gather some information on some of their basic characteristics, most notably their 
correlation, frequency and severity (see Template 5), as they determine the magnitude 
and likely impact of a risk, which have implications for the vulnerability of specific 
population groups in a country.  
 
(i)   Correlation of risks 
 
One important characteristic of a risk is its size. Risks can be small, and only affect spe-
cific individuals or households. These so-called idiosyncratic risks (e.g., a non-epidemic 
health risk) are uncorrelated among individuals and/or regions. Risks that affect a group 
of households, an entire community (e.g., earthquakes, floods), the whole nation (e.g., 
economic crisis) or even several nations (e.g., a nuclear disaster, epidemic diseases) are 
called covariate risks; they are correlated among individuals and/or regions. Depending 
on their size, it is possible to distinguish between regional covariate, national covariate 
and international covariate shocks (see Box 11). 
 
Box 11: Risky events – classified according to their degree of correlation 
 
  Idiosyncratic risks  Regional covariant risks  Nation-wide and interna-
tional covariant risks 
Natural Risks    Rainfall  Earthquakes 
    Landslides  Floods 
    Volcanic eruptions  Droughts 
      Strong Winds 
Health Risks  Illness  Epidemic   
  Injury / Accident  Famines   
  Disability     
Life-cycle Risks  Birth / Maternity     
  Old-age     
  Death     
Social Risks  Crime  Terrorism  Civil strife 
  Domestic violence   Gangs  War 
      Social upheaval 
Economic Risks  Unemployment  Output collapse 
  Harvest failure  Balance of payments 
  Business Failure  Resettlement  Financial crisis 
      Currency crisis 
      Technology- or trade-induced 
terms of trade shocks 
Political Risks  Ethnic discrimination  Political default on social 
programs 
    Riots  Coup d’état 
Environmental Risks  Pollution   
    Deforestation   
      Nuclear Disaster 
Source: adopted from Holzmann and Jørgensen, 2000:12. 
 
The size of a risk will co-determine which risk management instruments might be an ap-
propriate response to a risk. For example, a risk that affects an entire region cannot be 31 
managed through insurance only within the region. It would require risk pooling with ar-
eas which are not subject to the risk at the same time. The correlation of a risk will also 
allow to determine which actors are (or should be) involved in the management of the 
risk. For example, idiosyncratic risks, such as a flu, can well be managed by informal or 
market-based risk management instruments. Highly correlated risks, however, such as 
malaria or HIV/AIDS, tend to require involvement of governments or international or-
ganizations, as informal or market-based instruments tend to break down when facing 
such risks (Holzmann, 2001:4).  
 
Holzmann and Jørgensen (2000:12) provide examples of risks classified by their degree 
of correlation (see Box 11 below). In Annex 2b, we provide an empirical example of such 
a “risk mapping exercise” carried out in Togo as part of an analysis to adopt a social pro-
tection strategy for the country (Bendokat and Tovo, 1999).  
 
(ii)   Severity of risks 
 
In addition to the correlation of risks it is important to gather some information on their 
severity. This implies to estimate the impact a risk is likely to have in terms of the ex-
pected welfare loss. If the loss is likely to be high, or catastrophic, the risk is defined as 
highly severe. Contrary, if the expected loss is likely to be low, or non-catastrophic, the 
risk is characterized by a low severity. The expected relative loss determines whether a 
household is vulnerable to an (expected) outcome that comes from risk. 
 
The expected relative welfare loss is a function of the asset base of a household, and the 
risk responses taken (see section 1.1.2). Households within a country tend to differ in 
both these dimensions, which explains the differences in outcomes – and vulnerabilities – 
of households. For example, the death of a breadwinner in one household with some 
wealth, relevant life insurance and other household members gainfully employed will 
have different relative welfare effects as compared to another household with a low asset 
base, in which the dead breadwinner was the only person generating household income 
and had no life insurance. While the first family might regard the cited risk as a highly 
severe one, the second family might only attribute a medium or low severity to the same 
risk. Thus, whether a risky event, such as a bad harvest, a lost job, an illness, etc. will 
push it into (or deeper into) poverty depends on its assets and risk responses (see also 
Siegel and Alwang, 1999). 
 
Why is it important to collect information on the severity of risks? Differences in the se-
verity of risks have implications for the adequate risk response, and the actors involved. 
Risks with a high severity, i.e., an outcome which is likely to be catastrophic, might re-
quire interventions from formal, public institutions maybe based on a high level of inter-
vention (see Box 3) while the management of risks with (an on average) low severity 
might be left to informal or market-based actors. 
 
Given the differences in assets and risk responses between households, estimating the 
severity of a risk for household is a complex task for an analyst. Ideally, they will provide 
some indication on which group of households are likely to be severely impacted by the 32 
risk, and which households will not. This requires to take the asset base of household 
groups into account, to estimate the size of the expected welfare loss, and predict whether 
the loss will be large enough to push a household below a threshold (e.g., the poverty 
line) or not.  
 
Alternatively, analysts can provide some indication of the severity of a risk with regard to 
an average household. A highly severe risk (e.g., a flooding, a severe illness, war, crimes, 
etc.) is then likely to increase the vulnerability of households on average, a risk with low 
severity (e.g., catching a flu) will not have such consequences (even though many poor 
households will experience a relatively high welfare loss). 
 
Estimations on the likely impact of a risk, i.e., its degree of severity, can be derived from 
previous experiences with the risk (and, for example, be extracted from country reports, 
and be based on the knowledge of country experts, NGOs, etc.). Highly severe risks can 
also be identified based on the basis of the perceptions of the inhabitants themselves, 
even though they are likely to focus on idiosyncratic risks (such as the death of a family 
member, unemployment or disease), while they are usually less aware of covariant risks 
(Bendokat and Tovo, 1999). 
 
(iii)   Frequency of the risk 
 
In addition to the correlation and severity of risks, their frequency is relevant to under-
stand the vulnerability of households to risks. Thus, researchers have to gather informa-
tion for each risk on whether it is a repeated or a single event
16. For example, is an earth-
quake in Nicaragua likely to be a single event, or does it happen more often? Information 
on the frequency of a risk (which can be low, medium or high), can be derived from 
country reports and information (e.g., data on weather patterns, morbidity rates, unem-
ployment statistics, etc.), and be based on information from country experts.  
 
Ideally, in addition to examining the frequency of a shock, analysts might want to get 
some indication (or projection) of when and how often a shock is likely to hit, i.e., the 
timing of the risk (e.g., if there are droughts every summer, earthquakes on average every 
other year, etc.). For example, Malawi is vulnerable to periodic droughts leading to sea-
sonal food shortages and related price increases of maize (Smith, 2001). Information like 
such should supplement the information collected by the researchers on the frequency of 
risks (see Template 5). 
 
Why is it important to collect information on the frequency of the risk? Differences in 
terms of the frequency have repercussions on the choice of risk management strategies. 
For example, a single, covariate risky event, such as a flood, can largely be managed 
through risk coping; if the flood was a regular or repeated event, however, ex ante risk 
responses (e.g., building dams in Bangladesh to lower risk exposure) might be a more 
efficient way of responding to the risk. In-depth information on the frequency of shocks 
                                                 
16 This distinction will only apply to non-permanent risks, such as natural risks or economic risks. Perma-
nent risks, such as the HIV/AIDS epidemic, can not be classified according to this characteristic. 33 
thus helps to understand what type of risk response might be more efficient, and in a dy-
namic perspective also more sustainable.  
 
Each of the characteristics of a risk described above will co-determine the optimal risk 
response. For example, (covariate) risks with low frequency but highly severe welfare 
effects (catastrophic covariate risks, such as a civil war, which tend to require interven-
tions from high levels, maybe international organizations) will demand different man-
agement strategies than risks with a high frequency, however low welfare effects (non-
catastrophic risks, such as non-communicable diseases, which can largely be managed by 
use of informal instruments). 
 
By way of the risk assessment conducted so far, it will be possible to provide a snapshot 
of current risks, and their characteristics. However, applying a time-period approach will 
expand the value of this exercise further. For example, in Ethiopia even the most optimis-
tic scenario for declining fertility implies a substantial increase in its population base over 
the next 25 years, from the current estimate of 54 million to approximately 92 million in 
2020 (World Bank, 1998). This demographic projection suggests that new needs with re-
gard to social risks are likely to arise. Information like such on contextual factors will 
provide the information needed to understand the potential development of risks within a 
country, which determine the vulnerability and future needs of the population.  
 
3.2.2  Measuring risk exposure 
 
As has been discussed in the first part of the paper, risky events as such do not imply that 
households are exposed to them (see section 1.1). Rather, there is a distinct difference 
between risk and risk exposure, which is especially true with regard to idiosyncratic 
risks
17. An individual’s exposure (or: susceptibility) to risks depends on various factors 
such as the health and nutritional status, physical assets such as housing, infrastructure 
and household location, and individual behavior.   
 
Thus, while identifying risks is important, measuring risk exposure, or the susceptibility 
to risks, is also critical if we are to understand vulnerability. This requires that analysts 
examine who (or: which part of the population) is actually exposed to the risks identified 
previously. For example, if unemployment is an economic risk in a country, what popula-
tion group is likely to be exposed to unemployment?  
 
While the conduct of such an exercise might seem quite straightforward with regard to 
region-wide or nation-wide covariate risks (a war, a flood or an earthquake will affect – 
however, not necessarily harm – a certain region and all its inhabitants), it is a more com-
plex task with regard to idiosyncratic risks. How can be captured who is likely to be af-
fected by unemployment? Or: how can be identified who is likely to be affected by crime 
or domestic violence? In what follows we discuss one possibility of measuring/estimating 
                                                 
17 Covariate shocks are in general common (covariant) to all households in a group (e.g., all households in a 
specific region are exposed to an earthquake, or a flood – whether these events have any relevance for the 
single household is, however, a different question, see section 3.2.1).  34 
risk exposure: by classifying risks according to life-cycle or population groups which are 
likely to be affected by the risks.  
  
So far, analysts should have generated information on risks, their nature, their correlation, 
their severity and frequency (see section 3.2.1). One further classification of risks, i.e. the 
classification of risks by life-cycle groups (i.e. age groups) and/or by population groups, 
will help to determine risk exposure. The basic idea is to classify risks into age-groups 
(and/or population groups) in which they are most likely to occur. For example, unem-
ployment will only affect adults in working age. Infant mortality is a risk that will affect 
infants, etc. (see Box 12 below for an example of Argentina, conducted as part of a study 
on managing social risks (World Bank, 2000a). Main risks have been classified according 
to age-groups, and – where such a classification was not feasible – a large “other risk” 
group; Annex 2c includes a similar example carried out for a study on social risks in the 
Dominican Republic).  
 
Box 12: Main risks by age-group in Argentina 
 
Age group  Main risks 
0-5 years  •  Stunted development 
 
6-14 years  •  Poor education quality (low human capital development) 
 
15-24 years  •  Low human capital development (education quality / attainment) 
•  Unemployment / low wages 
•  Inactivity (violence, substance abuse, etc.) 
 
25-64 years  •  Low income 
 
Over 65 years  •  Low income 
Risks prevalent in the general 
population 
•  Poor health care 
•  Poor housing / lack of basic infrastructure 
Source: World Bank, 2000a:8 
 
While the classification of risks by life-cycles has been empirically applied for social sec-
tor studies in several countries (e.g., Argentina (World Bank, 2000a), the Dominican Re-
public (World Bank, 2000b), Mexico (Hall and Arriagada, 2000) and Jamaica (Blank, 
2001)), and adopted as part of the health, nutrition and population sector strategy (World 
Bank, 1997), it has several shortcomings with regard to assessing risks. For example, a 
classification of risks by life-cycles or age-groups suggests that risks within an age-group 
have similar consequences for all people affected. However, the management of risks de-
pends very much on factors other than the age of a person at risk, e.g., on the family 
background, the existence of formal and informal risk management strategies, the gender 
of the person, etc. Also, risks might have consequences for others than the person ex-
posed, e.g. the unemployment of one household member will have an impact on the wel-
fare of all other household members (even though there can be age-specific consequences 
of one risk).  
 35 
Moreover, while a classification of idiosyncratic risks into life-cycle groups is helpful to 
obtain some indication of which risk (directly) affects which age-groups, many risks do 
not comply with this simple structure (as has also been emphasized in the empirical stud-
ies mentioned above). Above all, covariate risks (e.g., floods, wars, earthquakes, etc.) af-
fect individuals in general, independent of their age (even though different age-groups 
might be differently affected by such risks). Moreover, often risks are specific to popula-
tion groups, e.g. women, the poor, the rural population, or ethnic minorities regardless of 
their age (e.g., discrimination of women, ethnic minorities, etc.). This suggests that in ad-
dition (or alternatively) to classifying risks according to life-cycles (e.g., risks related to 
old-age, to birth, etc.), analysts might want to also classify risks by population groups 
(e.g., gender-related risks, risks of ethnic minorities, risks related to urban/rural regions, 
poverty, etc.). 
 
In Annex 1, we provide a template for the classification of risks according to age-groups 
and population groups (Template 6). Analysts are required to classify risks – whenever 
possible – accordingly.  
 
A classification of risks by life-cycle groups and/or population groups will provide some 
insights on who is exposed to risks. A more refined way of measuring risk exposure is a 
complex task – especially with regard to idiosyncratic risks. Measuring risk exposure of 
covariate risks is less complicated, as researchers might identify and collect information 
on relevant indicators, such as the proportion of people threatened by a civil strive, a 
flooding, an earthquake, etc. (see Box 13 for some examples of such indicators). Often, 
however, risk exposure is difficult to express in terms of concrete indicators, and/or data 
on these indicators will be missing. 
 





Indicators of risk exposure 
Natural Risks  
e.g., rainfall, landslides, volcanic eruptions earth-
quakes, floods, droughts, strong winds 
 
e.g., percent of population (or number of regions) 
exposed to specific natural or weather-related shocks  
Health Risks  
e.g., epidemic, famines 
 
e.g., prevalence of communicable diseases (such as 
AIDS), famines 
Social Risks  
e.g., crime, domestic violence, terrorism, war, social 
upheaval 
 
e.g., percent of population affected by war, violence, 
crime, or ethnic/class tensions 
Economic Risks  
e.g., unemployment, harvest failure, business failure, 
resettlement, output collapse, balance of payments, 
financial crisis, currency crisis, technology- or trade-
induced terms of trade shocks 
 
e.g., index of chronic or transitory macroeconomic 
distress and / or poor macroeconomic performance, 
economic forecast indicators, etc. 
Source: adopted from Coudouel et al., 2001a:7f. 
 
Thus, also outcome indicators (see section 3.1) can be used as a proxy for risk exposure. 
For example, unemployment rate measures the proportion of people unemployed, rather 
than the proportion of people exposed to (future) unemployment. Nonetheless, outcomes 36 
can provide some indication of risk exposure, especially, if the composition of those af-
fected by the outcome is known. E.g., 5% of the Argentine population aged between 25 
and 64 years belong to the indigenous population group. However, 36% of all unem-
ployed in this age group belong to this population group (World Bank, 2000a). This sug-
gests that indigenous people have been affected over-proportionally by unemployment, 





3.3  The overall effectiveness of the SP system: Matching supply of and demand 
for interventions  
 
As important as capturing the needs of the poor is to evaluate whether the interventions 
available are adequate and/or successful in (i) helping the critically poor, and/or in (ii) 
helping the poor better manage risks. This requires to contrast the supply of social protec-
tion interventions (see section 2) with demand-side aspects, which as we discussed earlier 
can be observed and derived through an analysis of outcomes (section 3.1) and risk expo-
sure (section 3.2).  
 
Recent studies have indicated that very few countries have information that help them to 
estimate the demand for various social services (see Box 14). However, if the dynamic 
nature of the demand for and supply of social services is not considered, (public) inter-
ventions might very well be inconsequential to people’s needs.  
 
Box 14: Demand Side Financing in Education 
 
Demand side financing is a means by which governments and development partners have been trying to 
address the pressing issues in education delivery – namely access, equity and efficiency. This is because 
most current government education programs are substantially supply driven, and seldom give attention to 
the changing nature of demand. However, given the complexity in overhaul changes in government educa-
tion programs most approaches which have been designed to address this problem have been piece meal 
and small scale. Mechanisms like vouchers, stipends, targeted bursaries, vouchers and community financ-
ing have been used to effectively channel funds to institutions on the basis of expressed demand. However, 
not all demand side financing programs have been successful in addressing the problems and have had their 
fair share of difficulties and problems in implementation (see Patrinos and Ariasingam, 1997, for a review 
of these programs across countries). But still these programs have been a main mechanism by which educa-
tion programs have become more demand oriented, decentralized, and they have increased access and im-
proved targeting. The challenge for the future is to ensure that these programs become the basis of broader 
sector wide reforms which will ensure that good quality education is available to all at affordable costs to 
the individuals and the government. 
 
Source: Canagarajah et al., 2001: Box 5, pg. 18 
 
An example of how supply of and demand for SP interventions can be contrasted is pro-
vided in Box 15 below. Based on the ‘mismatches’ observed, analysts get a first indica-
tion of the weaknesses, but also the strengths, of a country’s SP system.  
                                                 
18 However, an alternative interpretation of the data suggests that indigenous people might be as likely as 
the rest of the population to be exposed to risks causing unemployment, but fail to properly manage these 
risks, and thus be more likely to actually lose their jobs than other population groups.  37 
 
Two types of mismatches should be differentiated. First, countries might experience gaps 




Second, there might be shortcomings in terms of the existing supply. This implies that 
although interventions are available, and indeed address risks and/or adverse outcomes, 
the effects of these interventions are unsatisfactory. If this is the case, analysts do have to 
examine the sources of these shortcomings. Various factors can account for them: For 
example, population groups might be excluded from the access to services by law (e.g., if 
women are denied property rights, etc.). Such absolute barriers of access (see Heitzmann 
et al., 2001) are encountered, if only specific population groups are entitled to specific 
instruments. For example, in many countries, unemployment insurance is only available 
to those employed in the formal labor market, while all workers in the informal labor 
market are excluded. Similarly, many countries confine several rights to men only. For 
example, in Togo, women do not have equal rights to men, and are discriminated in terms 
of access to social services (Bendokat and Tovo, 1999:10).  
 
However, instruments might also not be utilized for other reasons (e.g., lack of resources 
to pay insurance contributions, lack of information on how to protect against specific ill-
nesses, exclusion of families from social networks, etc.). Such relative barriers of access 
to risk management instruments can be manifold. For example, some risk management 
instruments might not be available throughout the country, but only in specific regions. 
Hospitals, health centers or high schools often are only available in the urban parts of the 
country, making it difficult for the rural population to obtain relevant services. Also, the 
scarcity of assets can prevent households from utilizing certain instruments. For example, 
many households can not afford to pay insurance premiums, and thus can not acquire this 
type of instrument. In addition to financial assets, also other assets might play an impor-
tant role (see Siegel and Alwang, 1999, for a discussion of tangible and intangible assets 
of households). Take information as an example: individuals who do not recognize 
HIV/AIDS as a risk, as is the case in many Sub-Saharan African countries, and/or do not 
know how to protect themselves against it, might not take relevant risk management in-
struments, even though they would be readily available. 
 
To account for these differences in terms of access and utilization of available risk man-
agement instruments, analysts have to gather some information on which subgroups of 
the population (e.g., separated by men and women, formal and informal workers, urban 
and rural populations, ethnic groups, poor and non-poor) utilize which SP instruments. If 
possible, analysts should differentiate between absolute and relative barriers of access 
(see Template 7 in Annex 1).  
                                                 
19 Of course, existing public interventions in SP could neither address adverse outcomes nor risks. It is im-
portant to consider such instruments, and to examine whether a reorientation of public resources to an al-
ternative intervention (or a set of interventions) might prove to be a more efficient way of allocating scarce 
resources (such an analysis, of course, has to take account of the likely effects an abolishment of the inter-
vention would have – maybe the program is successful in reducing a risk, or improving an otherwise ad-
verse outcome).   38 
In addition to questions of absolute and relative access barriers, SP interventions might be 
inefficient in terms of service delivery, administration, or the outcomes they produce, etc. 
Analysts have to provide some indication of the underlying source that manifests the 
problems in terms of mismatching supply of and demand for SP interventions. This in-
formation can then be used as a preliminary reference for the overall effectiveness of the 
existing SP system, and as a background information for the in-depth analysis of specific 
programs which follows in section 4.  
 
Annex 2c contains an interesting country example from the Dominican Republic, in 
which the researchers adopted a similar approach to examine the gaps and shortcomings 
in terms of current interventions, and suggest options to cure them. They identified risks 
by age groups (i.e., a proxy measure for risk exposure) including broad  “other risk” 
groups. In-depth information on the proportion of poor people exposed to these risks en-
hanced the content of the data provided. Then, the study focused on how to cover the 
gaps identified, and proposes both social protection and non-social protection measures 
as potential remedies. Similar studies have been carried out for Argentina (World Bank, 
2000a), Mexico (Hall and Arriagada, 2000), as well as other countries (see Bendokat and 
Tovo (1999) for Togo, Blank (2001) for Jamaica etc.). The difficulty in terms of this ex-
ercise is for analysts to decide whether the gaps and shortcomings can be closed by SP 
interventions, or whether interventions from other sectors might be more apt and/or effec-
tive in this respect.  
 
 Box 15: Contrasting supply- and demand side aspects in regard to SP (Illustrative Example) 
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Source: partly adopted from Coudouel et al. , 2001a, Table 1, pg. 5. 4.   Analyzing the Effectiveness and Efficiency of SP Interventions 
 
After having identified the overall effectiveness of SP interventions in meeting the needs 
of the poor (section 3.3), this section is concerned with providing some guidance to 
evaluate specific SP policies and programs in more-depth. It is important to emphasize 
that this section does not include a comprehensive guideline for the conduct of a (public) 
expenditure review. The relevant rules, and best-practice examples for carrying out such 
an exercise can be found elsewhere (e.g., Pradhan, 1996, Chu and Hemming, 1992; see 
also the most useful World Bank intranetsite on public expenditures, with many links to 
country examples). Rather, this section will focus on issues and instruments that analysts 
might want to specifically consider when carrying out expenditure reviews for SP inter-
ventions (and indeed interventions from other social sectors as well). 
 
 
4.1  The policy framework: an enabling environment? 
 
As has been argued previously (see section 1.1.1), SP measures aim to help the poor 
manage risk, and provide help to the critically poor. However, successful (public) SP 
programs require fiscal, administrative and policy resources which are usually limited in 
poor countries. Thus, the budget size is among the factors that determine the strengths as 
well as the constraints of the existing SP system. This system, moreover, is shaped by 
administrative capacities, the quality of institutions, the political economy, beliefs, values 
and norms, etc. All these determinants account for the compatibility between the SP pol-
icy framework and the expenditure programs in a country, and explain the relative suc-
cess of the overall SP system (see section 3.3).  
 
Thus, information on these aspects is relevant to understand the policy framework in 
which SP program operate. Information on these contextual factors usually form part of 
social sector (and other) reviews (see for example, Blank, 2001; World Bank, 2000a; 
World Bank, 2000b; World Bank, 1998) and also have to be considered as part of a com-
prehensive SP expenditure, performance and finance review. Relevant information on the 
policy framework is included in country reports from several international and donor or-
ganizations, university publications, etc. Analysts might also want to carry out (semi-
structured) interviews with key stakeholders in the country (e.g., political decision-
makers, NGOs, etc.). 
 
Information that analysts might want to include in such an overview range from informa-
tion on the general (macro-)economic situation of a country (e.g., GDP per capita, GDP 
growth per annum, labor market situation, etc.), socio-economic aspects (e.g., propor-
tions and composition of the poor, poverty trends over time, etc.), main values and tradi-
tions prevalent in a country, and relevant for SP (e.g., the role of women in society, the 
role of the public sector, etc.), as well as the policy and regulatory framework imple-
mented for SP, including information on the quality of the institutional framework, 
organizational capacities and quality (e.g., the budget discipline, budget cycle-decision 
making instruments, human and technical capacities in terms of monitoring and evaluat-
ing expenditures, etc.). Some examples of information needs are provided below (section 41 
4.1.1 to 4.1.2). Depending on time and resources, analysts might want to enlarge this part 
of the exercise, though. 
 
4.1.1   Macro-economic and socio-economic aspects 
 
With regard to the economic and macro-economic environment, analysts might want to 
present data on key macroeconomic indicators, e.g., GDP per capita, GDP growth, infla-
tion data, etc. and provide comparisons with similar countries to identify the relative eco-
nomic status (and likely development) of a country. In terms of (public) expenditures, 
analysts should identify the GDP proportion of SP expenditures, ideally classified into 
functions and/or risk management strategy for which the expenditures occurred. A thor-
ough evaluation of SP spending per capita, both in absolute and relative terms will pro-
vide information that helps to understand priorities and constraints for SP. 
 
In terms of socio-economic characteristics, analysts might want to include the proportion 
and composition of poor people in the country, poverty trends, as well as key indicators 
on the socio-economic situation (e.g., infant mortality rate, prevalence of HIV/AIDS, 
etc.) in order to identify country-specific strengths and weaknesses in this respect (see 
also Box 8 for relevant outcome indicators derived from the IDG that can be relevant in 
this respect). Analysts might also want to recapitulate what the most vulnerable groups 
are in this respect (see also section 3.2), and provide some indication of their role in soci-
ety, and explanation for their disadvantages status. In this context, analysts might also 
want to provide some indication of the prevalent value, tradition and belief system. Issues 
that analysts might want to consider in this respect, are, for example, the perception of the 
population in terms of public versus private partnership, the role of families and commu-
nities, the role of children and their tasks in the household, etc. Qualitative instruments, 
such as focus group discussions, interviews with NGOs, etc. are useful instruments that 
might be helpful in this respect (see also section 4.2.7). 
 
4.1.2  Assessing the institutional capacities 
 
Often, services in countries are not delivered effectively because of a lack of institutional 
and administrative capacity. This has important implications for the regulating, coordinat-
ing, monitoring and evaluating roles that also essential for SP and other programs and 
interventions. Various studies have highlighted the weak institutional structure as the 
main concern in improving the quality and performance of social sector interventions and 
related outcomes. Studies on health and education have been useful in addressing the in-
stitutional capacity issues (Pradhan, 1996). Similar studies need to be conducted for SP. 
The recent ILO Social Budget Model provides a good basis to start inquiry on this rather 
broad and complex issue (Scholz et al., 2000, on the ILO model of social budgeting). 
Moreover, the SP Chapter for the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers includes a discus-
sion of institutional delivery mechanisms (Coudouel 2001b: 5ff.) that analysts might want 
to consult.   
 
One example of the quality of the institutional framework is the capacity of countries to 
stick to their budget cycle. In most countries the annual budget process has become a me-42 
chanical exercise to allocate funds without being based on clear policy choices, priorities, 
or strategic objectives. The sector ministry budget preparation process is trivialized by 
the fact that the ministry of finance has final approval on which programs/expenditures 
are given priority with very little knowledge from a technical point of view. The absence 
of an effective decision-making process, and the missing links between policy-making, 
policy-planning and the budget exercise, leads to mismatches between what is promised 
through government policies and what is actually affordable (World Bank, 1998). Thus, 
policy, planning, and the budget cycle need to be more closely linked to each other to 
achieve the desired outcomes (see, for example, Scholz et al., 2000), and to help address 
governance and public sector performance concerns. Up until now, however, only little 
systematic progress has been made, hampering the effective delivery of social sector ser-
vices through budgets.  
 
4.1.3  Assessing the policy and regulatory framework 
 
Analysts are also required to gather information on the policy and regulatory framework 
that is relevant for SP interventions. It is important to emphasize that policies and regula-
tions do not only shape SP programs and projects, they are in themselves an important 
part of the SP system, and – in a broader aspect – in the system of risk management. For 
example, the existence and enforcement of labor market policies and regulations are im-
portant means to reduce or prevent many risks. A prohibition of child labor prevents – if 
it is enforced – risks related to harmful labor for children. Regulations in terms of safety 
at work is able to prevent many work-related accidents, etc. Also minimum wage regula-
tions, or hiring and firing rules, as well as regulation on severance pay regulate the labor 
market, and reduce or postpone income or job loss (see also Coudouel et al., 2001a: 
11ff.).  
 
Thus, analysts are required to provide some information on the policy and regulatory 
framework, including information on the enforcement of regulations, sanctions, etc. Also 
a reconsideration of the existing value and belief system (see section 4.1.1) will be help-
ful in this respect, not least to understand the ‘rationale’ of the existing framework. For 
example, the Togolese perceive gender discrimination as the ‘way things are’, which ex-
plains why hardly any SP interventions focus on women specifically (Bendokat and 
Tovo, 1999:10f).  
 
 
4.2  SP interventions: examining their effectiveness and efficiency 
 
After having identified the country-specific policy framework (section 4.1), SP programs 
need to be evaluated in more detail in terms of their effectiveness, efficiency, and finance 
issues. Based on such information, countries will be better able to prioritize expenditures 
and interventions which is an important need in SP.  
 
According to Pradhan (1996:6), “a program as a set of expenditures within or across a 
sector with relatively homogeneous benefits constitutes a useful unit of analysis”. Given 
the plethora of SP programs that operate in countries, it will be feasible to focus on a sub-43 
set of these for more in-depth analysis. Programs that receive substantial budget alloca-
tions, that affect large groups of people, that focus specifically on vulnerable population 
groups, or that appear to address important, largely unmet needs/demands of the poor 
could be considered in this respect. A mapping exercise of programs according to these 
(and other) aspects will facilitate the selection of the subset of programs, analysts might 
want to examine in more-depth (see Box 16 for an illustrative example of such a mapping 
exercise). It is important to stress once again that this assessment should not only focus 
on programs that are publicly provided or financed, but also on (at least important) pri-
vate programs. 
 
Box 16: Mapping of SP programs – An illustrative example  
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Depending on the selection of programs for an in-depth examination, analysts will want 
to quickly assess what information is readily available. Data from several sources, e.g., 
budgets, administrative statistics, expert opinions of officials and informed critics of the 
interventions, household survey data, and data of other surveys might be appropriate for 
the examination (Coudouel et al., 2001a: 9f). The main problem analysts will encounter, 
however, is a lack of relevant information and data. In this case, they are required to 
document the information needs, which will provide grounds for policymakers to create 
mechanisms to ensure that adequate data will be available for future, ongoing or periodic 
assessments.   
 
While both public and private programs could form part of the assessment (as far as ex-
isting data will allow to do so), public interventions have to be examined in terms of their 
rationale (see also section 1.2). Fozzard et al. (2001: 20ff) provide some examples of 
mechanisms that help to identify market failures and equity concerns that public program 
intend to address (see also Devarajan et al., 1996, Pradhan, 1996). Many countries al-44 
ready have adopted a review plan that helps them to systematically, and over time assess 
the rationale of public interventions  (Fozzard et al., 2001).   
 
4.2.1  Time-frame of the analysis  
 
One aspect that becomes particularly relevant with regard to SP (as well as other social 
sectors) is the time-period analysts will take into consideration to review programs. Many 
SP interventions both from the private sectors and the public sector are long-term in dura-
tion
20. For example, pension programs are often reflected by high cumulative expendi-
tures (see, for example, Holzmann et al., 2001, on the implicit pension debt). Moreover, 
expenditures for long-term programs often accrue different levels of costs at different pe-
riods of time. The expenditures within one fiscal year thus can only be understood, if the 
costs of previous or future budgets are also taken into account.  
 
Nonetheless, for pragmatic reasons expenditure reviews usually only take a specified 
short-term period into account, most n otably one fiscal year. This artificial snapshot 
might constrain the quality of a SP review considerably. Thus, it is crucial that analysts  
include – as far as possible – information from more than one fiscal year in their review 
(t, t-1, t-2) of SP expenditures – as is common procedure in the PER work of the World 
Bank
21 (see Pradhan, 1996). Also a projection of future expenditures (in period t+1, etc.) 
would enhance the validity of the review, and provide preliminary information on the 
(fiscal) sustainability of SP programs.  
 
Box 17: Tools for an analysis of SP programs 
 
•  assessment of the economic classification of expenditures 
•  public expenditure tracking surveys 
•  cost-effectiveness analysis 
•  cost-benefit analysis 
•  benefit-incidence analysis / average and marginal benefit incidence analysis of SP expenditures 
•  ERR, IRR, or cost-benefit analysis of SP expenditures by category 
•  taxonomy of financing social protection 
•  beneficiary assessments and qualitative participatory studies, etc. 
  
In what follows, some specific expenditure analysis tools (see Box 17) are presented that 
might assist analysts in reviewing SP programs. In general, instruments that are used for 
traditional PERs (see, for example Pradhan, 1996) can also be used for the SP sector, and 
will not be discussed in detail here. Rather, we will focus on instruments and approaches 
that might be helpful with regard to the specifics of SP (see also Coudouel et al., 2001a). 
                                                 
20 This long-term duration of many SP programs is also one of the reasons that the links between expendi-
tures and (final) outcomes are disguised (see also section 3.1). 
21 Not least against the background of long-term programs, the introduction of medium-term expenditure 
frameworks (MTEF) has become a common request in the conduct of public expenditures reviews in the 
Bank (see World Bank, 2001b). The establishment of  MTEFs allows for adopting a medium- to long-term 
perspective to budgeting in order to effectively link policies, plans and budgets (see Bevan, 2000, for an 
example on Uganda). This approach also stresses the need to understand the rules of the game that govern 
budget formulation and execution and the way institutions influence the choice and achievement of gov-
ernment objectives (World Bank, 2001b:4). 45 
It is important to emphasize that no tool on its own is able to assists in evaluating all effi-
ciency issues, rather a mixture of tools has to be applied, as some tools can deal with a 
subset of efficiency issues more effectively than others. Moreover, as has been men-
tioned, analysts do have to consult the traditional instruments used for the conduct of a 
public PER, which are not presented below
22.  
 
Below we provide a brief description of each of these tools. Ideally, both quantitative as 
well as qualitative information ought to be gathered. It is essential that good-practice ex-
amples on each tool are built which are available from past sectoral public expenditure 
review exercises carried out by various countries in collaboration with the World Bank. 
 
4.2.2   Assessment of the economic classification of expenditures 
 
The GFS of the IMF allows for both a functional (see section 2.2.2) and an economic 
classification of expenditures.  In general an economic classification identifies (i) the 
types of expenses incurred to produce goods and services, such as compensation of em-
ployees, and (ii) the types of transfer payments made, such as social benefits (see IMF, 
2001). The latter category allows to get some indication of an important financing source 
of SP interventions, i.e., public transfers. 
 
With regard to the first category, the economic classification of expenditures allows to 
get an impression of the proportion of capital versus recurrent expenditures
23. Especially 
with regard to social services, the economic classification of expenditures suggests con-
siderable challenges with regard to the sustainability of expenditures (see footnote 23, 
and chapters on health and education, in Pradhan, 1996: 51ff, as examples).  
 
A cross-classification of both, the functional and economic classification allows to jointly 
analyze the level of service provision (primary/secondary in education or preven-
tive/curative in health) and the economic type of the expenditures (wages/salaries, 
equipment etc.). Moreover, a thorough evaluation of the economic classification of public 
expenditures within each function will provide useful information on the financial sus-
tainability of public sector programs and interventions both in the short-run as well as in 
the long-run (Pradhan, 1996). 
 
                                                 
22 This requirement also refers to best-practices of conducting PERs in a country, e.g., whether it should be 
a wholly in-house PER, a Bank-led PER, or a joint- or client-led PER, which are not considered here. There 
is extensive experience within the World Bank for all these types of public expenditure reviews (see for 
example the participatory PER for Vietnam, or the Uganda’s client-led PER, etc., Gray et al., 2000a, 
2000b). 
23 Capital expenditures cover payments for the purchase or production of new or existing goods with a life 
of more than one year, e.g., for bridges, roads, schools, health clinics, etc. Current or recurrent expenditures 
include wages and salaries, other goods and services (including non-wage operations and maintenance), 
interest payments, and subsidies and other current transfers. The following patterns of public under- and 
overspending are common across sectors: a bias toward new capital investments, the underfunding of non-
wage operations and maintenance, and overstaffing including relatively high wage-costs (see Pradhan, 
1996, 33ff.) 46 
4.2.3  Public expenditure tracking surveys 
 
Tracking surveys can be a very effective tool in understanding the inefficiencies of budg-
etary planning and delivery of services. In Uganda this tool was effectively used in the 
mid-1990s to address the hypothesis that actual service delivery was worse than budget 
allocations implied (see Box 18). Various other countries have implemented tracking sur-
veys since, most notably with regard to health and education expenditures (e.g., see Ca-
nagarajah and Ye, 2001, for Ghana). 
 
Box 18: The Uganda Education Tracking Survey 
 
In 1996, surveys were carried out for health and education in Uganda. The purpose was to test the hypothe-
sis that public budgeted and released funds do not reach the intended facilities and hence that outcomes 
cannot improve despite increases in spending. The survey findings strongly confirmed this hypothesis for 
education. It was found that on average only 30% of released funds reached primary schools, but this aver-
age was highly unrepresentative: At the median, 0% of the money reached primary schools. It was found 
that funds were mainly reallocated at district level. Unfortunately, it was not possible to obtain similar con-
firmation for health due to lack of data.  
 
In response to the findings of the education survey, the Ministry of Finance implemented a number of key 
policy interventions. The key intervention was to provide users (schools and PTAs) with information about 
transfers of government funds to schools. In particular, the information on releases was published in the 
main newspapers and broadcast on radio. District administrations were also instructed to pay the school 
funds into school accounts instead of retaining funds in their own accounts. And finally the highly ineffi-
cient system of central procurement of supplies to schools was replaced by school-based procurement.  
 
In early 2000, a second tracing study was carried out for primary schools in Uganda, which followed 4 in-
dividual monthly releases of funds from Ministry of Finance level down to some 400 primary schools. The 
study found that on average 90% of released funds now reached schools. More importantly, 80% of funds 
reached primary schools at the median. It is widely perceived that the key to achieving this tremendous 
improvement in funding to schools was the publication of information of entitlements to stakeholders.  
 
With most of the money now reaching schools, the attention is shifting to trying to identify the factors, 
which account for the residual variation in receipts as well as the differences in cost efficiency across facili-
ties. 
 
Source: Canagarajah et al., 2001: Box 7, pg. 22f. 
 
 
The potential reasons for delivery problems (see also Coudouel et al., 2001b: Technical 
Note 1.2) range from competing priorities at various levels of government to corruption 
and misuse of public funds. Tracking surveys provide a useful instrument in ‘following’ 
the money from the time it is released from the budget to the ultimate delivery of the in-
tended service to the beneficiary, and in highlighting the bottlenecks in the system. Al-
though these surveys are time-consuming and can be quite cumbersome to implement, 
they are an effective means of arriving at specific programs and policies which can rec-
tify the problems in the existing system. 
 
While tracking surveys thus examine whether resources actually reach the program they 
are supposed to finance, they do not allow to make any inferences with regard to the ef-47 
fectiveness of the programs. Thus, in what follows some proposals are made on how ana-
lysts might want to assess the effectiveness of SP programs
24.  
  
4.2.4  Cost-effectiveness analysis and cost-benefit analysis 
 
Traditionally, cost-effectiveness analysis compares the costs of different program options 
that attempt to achieve the same output. Based on this comparison, the least cost interven-
tion is chosen as most cost-effective delivery mechanism. For example, governments 
have different possibilities of providing food to a specific target group. They can (i) pro-
vide price subsidies, (ii) issue means-tested food stamps, or (iii) organize that food ra-
tions are given away at public health centers. Analysts would have to calculate the unit 
costs of each of these different instruments (e.g., costs per meal delivered), and – based 
on this comparison – propose the most cost-effective instrument (Valadez and Bamber-
ger, 1994).   
 
In SP, “classic” cost-effectiveness analysis is limited to cases where the specific output 
indicator of programs is identical. SP programs, however, usually have a broad range of 
specific objectives for which outputs are difficult to specify (increase caloric intake, de-
crease the poverty headcount, lower unemployment rates). Also, the data required for a 
classic analysis are not likely to be available in quantitative form for all interventions to 
be evaluated.  
 
Thus, a somewhat different practice can be more meaningful (see Coudouel et al., 2001a: 
15f.): Rather than calculating the costs of the programs, different aspects of the programs 
could be examined, e.g., their sustainability, targeting, administrative costs, institutional 
structure, unintended effects, and constraints. Judgments can be made after systematically 
considering the information on each dimension for each program. In Annex 1 we provide 
a template with questions that help to explore these different dimension of the cost-
effectiveness of SP programs (see Template 8).  
 
The questions included in Template 8 were originally developed to evaluate public ex-
penditure programs. They do apply, however, also for an analysis of public regulations 
and contribution-based social insurance programs (for a more detailed analysis of labor 
market regulations and social insurance programs, see Coudouel et al., 2001a: 11ff.), and 
for an analysis of private sector provision, and of informal private arrangements
25 – both 
of which should form part of a comprehensive SP expenditure, performance and finance 
review (see introduction to this paper, and section 1.1).  
 
This diagnosis not only enables a summary judgment about which programs are more 
cost-effective than others, but it also yields i nformation about how each intervention 
might be made more effective, and thus provides insights into priorities for reform. A 
                                                 
24 The following section is largely derived from the Social Protection Chapter of the Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Papers, see Coudouel et al., 2001a: 15f.) 
25 The costs of private programs may not be to the government but to the individuals in the network that 
provides the transfer or insurance. For market-based provision of say, pensions, insurance for life, health, 
or property, or savings vehicles, issues of coverage and constraints may be particularly relevant. 48 
country might, for example, discover that in its public works program, only 20 percent of 
the costs are for unskilled labor, which is well below the international standard (for best-
practices, see Coudouel et al., 2001b, Technical Annex 2). A change in the labor intensity 
of the works financed might increase the income available to the poor in the short run. 
 
As has been argued above, classical cost-effectiveness analysis might not be an appropri-
ate instrument to value benefits or quantify externalities in SP. However, standard cost 
benefit analysis is an important tool to assist policymakers in determining whether the 
social value of a particular intervention exceeds its social costs. It should be noted though 
that some benefits are difficult to measure – given the externalities generated by most SP 
programs and interventions. Some progress on this issue has been made in the context of 
social funds (Owen and van Domelan, 1998), and pensions through PROST toolkits (see 
Annex 3). However, a wider use of cost benefit analysis is necessary to increase the effi-
ciency of public delivery of SP interventions. 
 
4.2.5  Average and marginal benefit incidence analysis 
 
Benefit incidence analysis is a common method used to infer the distributional impacts of 
intra-sectoral public expenditures (see Box 19). The average benefit incidence of public 
expenditure is the proportion of expenditures subsidizing completely or partially the utili-
zation of a given service by households in a given income or expenditure quintile. The 
marginal incidence is the incremental increase in the share of expenditures going to a 
given quintile, with a change in spending on the program. Both these instruments have 
been found very useful in policy discussions with regard to social sector reforms in many 
countries in addition to unit cost analysis which has been very common in past studies 
(Castro-Leal et al., 1999; Lanjouw and Ravallion, 1999).  
 
4.2.6  Taxonomy of financing social services 
 
Any study on the efficiency of SP expenditures will be incomplete without a proper 
analysis of the sources of financing (see section 2.1). Preliminary analysis of financial 
sources of SP services (see Template 3) will have provided evidence of a mixed basket. 
For instance, individual contributions are very important for some programs in some 
countries, while in others it is donor funding that is necessary for sustaining provision of 
many services. In addition, government finance covers most of the overheads of social 
service provision in most countries. Some studies, however, have revealed substantial 
subsidies and cross subsidization of social services, some leading to perverse patterns of 
financing (Velez and Foster, 2000).  
 
In this context, it is essential to reconsider who pays what part of total expenditures, and 
how this enables the financing of social service provision (see also Template 3). The 
mismatch between the needy, the poor, and the contributors is overwhelming to the ex-
tent that studies on efficiency and sustainability of financing social services need to pay 
closer attention to the sources of funding of different programs and agencies in social 
service delivery.  
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Box 19: Benefit Incidence Analysis in Education 
 
Benefit incidence analysis is a powerful technique for assessing how efficiently public spending is targeted 
to the poor. The analysis links information provided by the public sector (estimated from the government’s 
fiscal accounts) about the subsidy for different kinds of education with the distributional profile of utiliza-
tion of public schools (obtained from households through a multipurpose survey such as the Living Stan-
dards Measurement Survey). A recent review of benefit incidence analysis in education by van de Walle 
and Nead (1995) concludes that, while education sector expenditures vary in their incidence according to 
the level of service, primary and secondary education are usually more pro-poor than university/higher 
education (see Table below). For instance, a review of 13 country studies indicates that, on average, only 
10 percent of the subsidies for higher education went to the poorest 40% of the population, while 43% of 
subsidies for "all education" accrued to this income group.   
 
Carrying out a benefit incidence analysis typically involves three basic steps: 
￿ Identify the distribution of student enrollment rates in public schools across population quintiles sorted 
by income level ranging from poor to rich 
￿   Estimate the unit subsidies for each level of schooling from the government finance data 
￿  Combine this data in an estimate of the incidence of per capita subsidies accruing to each quintile 
 
Examples of benefit incidence analyses of education subsidies in selected countries 
Country and Year  Poorest 20% of Population  Richest 20% of Population 
Ghana ( 1992)  15  21 
Côte d'Ivoire (1995)  13  35 
Malawi (1994)  16  25 
Kenya (1992)  17  21 
Uganda (1992/3)  13  32 
For a more detailed description on how to conduct benefit incidence analysis, see L. Demery's "Benefit 
Incidence Analysis: Informing Public Choice."  A hands-on training module, "Fiscal Analysis and Projec-
tions in Education," also offers a step-by-step guide for benefit incidence analysis.*  For a theoretical dis-
cussion on public spending and its effects on the poor, see van de Walle, "Public Spending and the Poor: 
Theory and Evidence." 
 
Limitations of Benefit Incidence Analysis: 
•  The technique can only deal with the incidence of spending on publicly subsidized private goods. 
•  Unit costs do not always reflect values. They also reflect inefficiency in public provision. For example, 
a tracking study in Uganda found that only 38% of non-wage recurrent primary education spending ac-
tually reached the schools. Quality variations in services are not always reflected in unit costs. 
•  The costs of programs are inadequate proxies for benefits received, and benefit incidence studies typi-
cally do not take into account the total costs of expenditure programs, including administrative costs, 
participation costs of the poor and other behavioral responses. 
•  The analysis is long on problems but short on answers. It is not informative as to why households be-
have the way they do. Benefit incidence just takes the pattern of service use as given, which tells us lit-
tle about what determines such behavior and what constrains households. For instance, even when the 
analysis points to increased allocation to primary-level services, it says little about how that money 
should be spent.   
* Examples of Benefit Incidence Analysis in Education: Meerman, J. (1979). Public Expenditures in Ma-
laysia: Who Benefits and Why? Selowsky, M. (1979). Who Benefits from Government Expenditures? A 
Case Study of Colombia. World Bank (1990). Indonesia: Poverty Assessment and Strategy Report, Report 
8034-IND. The World Bank. Demery, L., J. Dayton, and K. Mehra (1996). The Incidence of Social Spend-




One of the important efficiency issues which has been neglected in most studies is the 
impact of the timing and frequency of financing. They tend to be extremely irregular and 
unpredictable which has adverse effects on the quality and extent of service provision. In 
addition, analysts need to clearly understand which taxes are used for funding which pro-
grams/interventions and the rationale for funding through chosen sources. Unless these 
aspects are studied at greater detail we may find unsustainable financing practices leading 
to failure and limited coverage of social sector programs as is the case in many develop-
ing countries today. 
 
4.2.7  Beneficiary assessment and participatory studies 
 
PERs primarily focus on information on tangible items. However, there are some issues 
in the design and delivery of services that cannot be captured by quantitative data only, 
although they are equally important in evaluating the efficacy of a service delivery. In 
this context, undertaking beneficiary assessments can be useful in understanding the ma-
jor issues highlighted by beneficiaries, how they are related to quantitative data, and how 
they might be better addressed. Indeed, the recent use of beneficiary assessments and par-
ticipatory studies for policy and investment decisions is proving to be very useful (see for 
example, Amelga, 1994; Salmen, 1995; World Bank, 1995).  
 
By way of a systematic consultation with project beneficiaries and other stakeholders, 
beneficiary assessments attempt to identify and design development activities, signal any 
potential constraints to their participation, and obtain feedback on reactions to an inter-
vention during implementation. It is an investigation of the perceptions of a systematic 
sample of beneficiaries and other stakeholders to ensure that their concerns are heard and 
incorporated in programs and policy formulation. The general purposes of a beneficiary 
assessments are to undertake systematic listening, which "gives voice" to poor and other 
hard-to-reach beneficiaries, highlighting constraints to beneficiary participation, and to 
obtain feedback on interventions.  
 
Three data collection techniques are used within this qualitative method of investigation:  
(i) in-depth conversational interviewing around key themes or topics (which can be car-
ried out with individual beneficiaries or with groups in urban or rural settings), (ii) focus 
group discussions, and (iii) direct observation and participant observation (in which the 
investigator lives in the community for a short time). Although some innovative studies 
have been done carried out for health and education, they need to be extended further to 
cover also SP operations (Robb, 2000). A manual for social funds is included in Salmen, 
1999, best-practices of beneficiary assessments in the World Bank in Salmen, 2001.  51 
5.  Concluding remarks: The way forward 
 
The framework for a comprehensive SP expenditure, performance and finance review 
proposed here is built on two main rationales (section 1): the social risk management 
framework, which essentially argues to broaden the perspective of SP expenditures. SP is 
an investment rather than a cost to society, and should both help the poor escape poverty, 
and prevent (future) poverty. The vulnerability people face in this respect is in general the 
result of risks they face, and their inability to manage these risks. The role of the public 
sector in risk management, and thus also in SP, is crucial. However, given the scarcity of 
public resources, allocation decisions have to be made – based on some rationales for 
public intervention, which have been summarized in this paper.  
 
The simple guidance proposed here to carry out a SP expenditure, performance and fi-
nance review is essentially a blown-up version of the World Bank’s PER work. It differs 
in some important aspects though: first, the significance of private formal and informal 
activities in SP has been discussed, and an argument has been made to include them in a 
SP review (section 2). Secondly, it has been argued that traditionally PER work focuses 
on supply-side issues, while largely neglecting the demand for interventions. Thus, we 
have proposed some ways on how analysts might want to identify the demand for SP in-
terventions, and contrast this information with the existing supply to detect gaps and 
mismatches (section 3). Finally, this paper provided some guidance on how to assess SP 
interventions: in addition to implementing traditional PER instruments which have not 
been discussed in detail in this paper, alternative instruments, such as tracking surveys, 
and beneficiary assessments, might be particularly relevant in a social protection context, 
and these methods have been discussed (see section 4).  
 
We recognize the urgent need to build some pilot case studies around the framework pro-
vided here to establish some practical suggestions and ground rules of implementation. 
These can be more useful in carrying out a SP expenditure, performance and finance re-
view than the current framework itself is. Thus, we strongly recommend to carry out 
some pilot studies in a few countries to test its feasibility and to learn about its useful-
ness. A sequential approach is most likely to be successful: analysts entrusted with carry-
ing out the review would start with an assessment of main (public and private) SP pro-
grams before deciding on selective deepening of analysis and follow-ups. Moreover, it is 
suggested that the review begins with initial qualitative assessments and memorandum 
items before deciding on resource-consuming quantitative follow-ups. 
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Annex 1: Templates 
 
Template 1: Inventory of SP interventions (provision) available in a country  
 
  Available? 
Public Programs and Policies  yes     no 
   Food for work or labor-intensive public works  ￿       ￿ 
   Social funds  ￿       ￿ 
   Agricultural input subsidies (prices or vouchers)  ￿       ￿ 
   Energy subsidies  ￿       ￿ 
   Housing subsidies  ￿       ￿ 
   Food rations  ￿       ￿ 
   Food stamps  ￿       ￿ 
   School feeding programs  ￿       ￿ 
   School fee waivers or scholarships  ￿       ￿ 
   Employment legislation   ￿       ￿ 
      e.g., hiring and firing rules (incl. severance)  ￿       ￿ 
      e.g., contracting for labor  ￿       ￿ 
      e.g., minimum wage regulations  ￿       ￿ 
   Job search assistance  ￿       ￿ 
   Unemployment insurance  ￿       ￿ 
   Job retraining programs  ￿       ￿ 
   Integrated savings account  ￿       ￿ 
   Health insurance  ￿       ￿ 
   Needs-based cash social assistance  ￿       ￿ 
   Old age insurance   ￿       ￿ 
   Disability insurance  ￿       ￿ 
   Survivors insurance  ￿       ￿ 
   Noncontributory pension programs  ￿       ￿ 
   Regulatory framework for private pension programs  ￿       ￿ 
   Other:   ￿       ￿ 
Market-Based Arrangements  yes     no 
   Savings or credit from commercial outlets or NGOs  ￿       ￿ 
   Crop insurance  ￿       ￿ 
   Property insurance  ￿       ￿ 
   Private pension plans  ￿       ￿ 
   Private insurance for health and/or disability  ￿       ￿ 
   Private insurance for life  ￿       ￿ 
   Other:  ￿       ￿ 
Informal Arrangements  yes     no 
   Exchange of labor (for farming, construction, etc.) between households  ￿       ￿ 
   Transfer of cash, food, livestock between households  ￿       ￿ 
   Child fostering  ￿       ￿ 
   Reliance on children  ￿       ￿ 
   Dis-saving—selling assets, livestock, farm equipment, jewelry, drawing down savings  ￿       ￿ 
   Migration  ￿       ￿ 
   Tied labor  ￿       ￿ 
   Share cropping  ￿       ￿ 
   Savings or insurance associations or societies – roscas, tontines, burial societies  ￿       ￿ 
   Other:  ￿       ￿ 
Source: adopted from Coudouel et al., 2001a: Box 4, pg. 9f. 53 
Template 2: Inventory of public SP interventions (provision) by level of government  
 
 
    Provided by 
 
Public Programs and Policies 
Available? 







   Food for work/labor-intensive public works  ￿       ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
   Social funds  ￿       ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
   Agricult. input subsidies (prices/vouchers)  ￿       ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
   Energy subsidies  ￿       ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
   Housing subsidies  ￿       ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
   Food rations  ￿       ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
   Food stamps  ￿       ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
   School feeding programs  ￿       ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
   School fee waivers or scholarships  ￿       ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
   Employment legislation   ￿       ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
       e.g., hiring / firing rules (incl. severance)  ￿       ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
       e.g., contracting for labor  ￿       ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
       e.g., minimum wage regulations  ￿       ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
   Job search assistance  ￿       ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
   Unemployment insurance  ￿       ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
   Job retraining programs  ￿       ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
   Integrated savings account  ￿       ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
   Health insurance  ￿       ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
   Needs-based cash social assistance  ￿       ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
   Old age insurance   ￿       ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
   Disability insurance  ￿       ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
   Survivors insurance  ￿       ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
   Noncontributory pension programs  ￿       ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
   Reg. framework for priv. pension programs  ￿       ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
   Other:  ￿       ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
Source: adopted from Coudouel et al., 2001a: Box 4, pg. 9f. Template 3: Inventory of social protection intervention (finance) by source of origin  
 
    Financing by source of origin* 
  Available?  Public sector  Private sector 
Public Programs and Policies  yes     no  Local  Regional  National  corporations  NGOs  Households 
Rest of the 
World 
   Food for work/labor-intensive public works  ￿       ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
   Social funds  ￿       ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
   Agricultural input subsidies   ￿       ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
   Energy subsidies  ￿       ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
   Housing subsidies  ￿       ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
   Food rations  ￿       ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
   Food stamps  ￿       ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
   School feeding programs  ￿       ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
   School fee waivers or scholarships  ￿       ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
   Employment legislation   ￿       ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
      e.g., hiring and firing rules   ￿       ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
      e.g., contracting for labor  ￿       ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
      e.g., minimum wage regulations  ￿       ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
   Job search assistance  ￿       ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
   Unemployment insurance  ￿       ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
   Job retraining programs  ￿       ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
   Integrated savings account  ￿       ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
   Health insurance  ￿       ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
   Needs-based cash social assistance  ￿       ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
   Old age insurance   ￿       ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
   Disability insurance  ￿       ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
   Survivors insurance  ￿       ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
   Noncontributory pension programs  ￿       ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
   Reg. framework for private pensions   ￿       ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
   Other:   ￿       ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
Market-Based Arrangements  yes     no  Local  Regional  National  corporations  NGOs  Households  Rest of World 
   Savings/credit from comm. outlets / NGOs  ￿       ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
   Crop insurance  ￿       ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
   Property insurance  ￿       ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 55 
   Private pension plans  ￿       ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
   Private insurance for health / disability  ￿       ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
   Private insurance for life  ￿       ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
   Other:  ￿       ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
Informal Arrangements  yes     no  Local  Regional  National  corporations  NGOs  Households  Rest of World 
   Exchange of labor between households  ￿       ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
   Transfer of cash, food, livestock betw. hhs  ￿       ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
   Child fostering  ￿       ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
   Reliance on children  ￿       ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
   Dis-saving   ￿       ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
   Migration  ￿       ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
   Tied labor  ￿       ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
   Share cropping  ￿       ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
   Savings or insurance associations   ￿       ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
   Other:  ￿       ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
* all interventions that are financed by more than one financier (e.g., social services are financed by the public sector and households), require analysts to provide 
some indication of the proportion financed by each financier (e.g., 50% public sector and 50% households, etc.). 
 








   - disaggregated by rural/urban and other groups (women/men, vulnerable groups )  
 
Poverty depth 
   - disaggregated by rural/urban and other groups (women/men, vulnerable groups ) 
 
Levels of chronic poverty 
   - disaggregated by rural/urban and other groups (women/men, vulnerable groups ) 
 
Levels of transient poverty  
   - disaggregated by rural/urban and other groups (women/men, vulnerable groups ) 
 
Prevalence of seasonal hunger   
Distress sales of livestock    
Distress sales of land   
Child malnutrition rates   
Unemployment rates and estimates of underemployment 
   - disaggregated by rural/urban and other groups (women/men, vulnerable, age)  
 
Estimation of underemployment 
   - disaggregated by rural/urban and other groups (women/men, vulnerable, age) 
 
Estimation of formalization of labor market  
   - disaggregated by rural/urban and other groups (women/men, vulnerable, age) 
 
Estimation of informalization of labor market 
   - disaggregated by rural/urban and other groups (women/men, vulnerable, age) 
 
Primary-school dropout rate 
   - disaggregated by gender 
 
Incidence of child labor (% of children working both within and outside the hh) 
   -disaggregated by child labor inside and outside hh/farm; gender 
 
Hours worked by children (both within and outside the hh) 
   - disaggregated by child labor inside and outside hh/farm; gender 
 
Labor market situation for vulnerable groups  
   - disaggregated for youth, women, elderly 
 
Estimated percent of children or families left vulnerable or destitute as a result of 
communicable diseases (indicators for AIDS, for example, might include number of 
infected, number of infirmities, estimated number of orphans) 
 
Other:   
Source: adopted from Coudouel et al., 2001a: Box 3, pg. 8. 
 Template 5: Identification of risks and their basic characteristics in a country 
 
    Correlation   Severity*  Frequency ** 







high  medium  low  high  medium  low 
Natural Risks  Yes     No                   
Heavy Rainfall  ￿         ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
Landslides  ￿         ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
Volcanic eruptions  ￿         ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
Earthquakes  ￿         ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
Floods  ￿         ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
Droughts  ￿         ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
Strong Winds  ￿         ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
Other natural risks                                                    ￿         ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
Health Risks  Yes     No                   
Illness (e.g., AIDS)  ￿         ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
Injury   ￿         ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
Disability  ￿         ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
Epidemic (e.g., Malaria)  ￿         ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
Famines  ￿         ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
Other health risks                                                    ￿         ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
Life-cycle Risks  Yes     No                   
Birth / Maternity  ￿         ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
Old-age  ￿         ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
Death  ￿         ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
Other life-cycle risks                                                    ￿         ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
Social Risks  Yes     No                   
Crime  ￿         ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
Domestic violence   ￿         ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
Terrorism  ￿         ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
Gangs  ￿         ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
Civil strife  ￿         ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
War  ￿         ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 58 
Social upheaval  ￿         ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
Other social risks                                                    ￿         ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
Economic Risks  Yes     No                   
Unemployment  ￿         ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
Harvest failure  ￿         ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
Business Failure  ￿         ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
Resettlement  ￿         ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
Output collapse  ￿         ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
Balance of payments  ￿         ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
Financial crisis  ￿         ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
Currency crisis  ￿         ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
Terms of trade shocks  ￿         ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
Other economic risks                                                    ￿         ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
Political Risks  Yes     No                   
Discrimination  ￿         ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
Riots  ￿         ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
Political default   ￿         ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
Coup d’état  ￿         ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
Other political risks                                                    ￿         ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
Environmental Risks  Yes     No                   
Pollution  ￿         ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
Deforestation   ￿         ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
Nuclear Disaster  ￿         ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
Other environmental risks                                     ￿         ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
Source: adopted from Heitzmann et al., 2001: Annex 1 Template 1 
*Ad severity  
•  provide separate templates on the severity of risks by population groups (e.g. poor/non-poor, men/women, rural/urban, etc. (see Template 6). 
**Ad frequency  
•  how often does the event occur on average? (e.g., once a year, every other fall, etc.). 
•  when is it likely to strike next? (e.g. every summer, in about five years, not known, etc.). 
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Template 6: Classifying risks by age-groups and population groups 
 





0-3  4-5  6-11  12-18  19-24  25-64  65+  all  poor  non-
poor 
women  men  urban  local  other 
Heavy Rainfall  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
Landslides  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
Volcanic eruptions  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
Earthquakes  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
Floods  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
Droughts  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
Strong Winds  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 





0-3  4-5  6-11  12-18  19-24  25-64  65+  all  poor  non-
poor 
women  men  urban  local  other 
Illness (e.g., AIDS)  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
Injury   ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
Disability  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
Epidemic (e.g., Malaria)  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
Famines  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 





0-3  4-5  6-11  12-18  19-24  25-64  65+  all  poor  non-
poor 
women  men  urban  local  other 
Birth / Maternity  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
Old-age  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
Death  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 





0-3  4-5  6-11  12-18  19-24  25-64  65+  all  poor  non-
poor 
women  men  urban  local  other 
Crime  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
Domestic violence   ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
Terrorism  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
Gangs  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
Civil strife  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 60 
War  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
Social upheaval  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 





0-3  4-5  6-11  12-18  19-24  25-64  65+  all  poor  non-
poor 
women  men  urban  local  other 
Unemployment  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
Harvest failure  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
Business Failure  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
Resettlement  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
Output collapse  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
Balance of payments  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
Financial crisis  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
Currency crisis  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
Techn.- or trade-induc. 
terms of trade shocks 
￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 





0-3  4-5  6-11  12-18  19-24  25-64  65+  all  poor  non-
poor 
women  men  urban  local  other 
Discrimination  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
Riots  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
Political default   ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
Coup d’état  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 





0-3  4-5  6-11  12-18  19-24  25-64  65+  all  poor  non-
poor 
women  men  urban  local  other 
Pollution  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
Deforestation   ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
Nuclear Disaster  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
Other environmental risks                                                    ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
Source: adopted from Heitzmann et al., 2001: Annex 1 Template 2 
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Template 7: Availability of and access of population groups to SP instruments 
 
    Population groups* 































Public Programs and Policies  Yes     No  Yes     No  Yes     No  Yes     No  Yes     No  Yes     No  Yes     No  Yes     No  Yes     No 
Food for work/ public works  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿ 
Social funds  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿ 
Agricultural input subsidies   ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿ 
Energy subsidies  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿ 
Housing subsidies  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿ 
Food rations  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿ 
Food stamps  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿ 
School feeding programs  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿ 
School fee waivers/scholarships  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿ 
Employment legislation   ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿ 
   e.g., hiring and firing rules   ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿ 
   e.g., contracting for labor  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿ 
   e.g., minimum wage regul.  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿ 
Job search assistance  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿ 
Unemployment insurance  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿ 
Job retraining programs  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿ 
Integrated savings account  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿ 
Health insurance  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿ 
Needs-based cash soc. assist.   ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿ 
Old age insurance   ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿ 
Disability insurance  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿ 
Survivors insurance  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿ 
Noncontribut. pension program  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿ 
Regulatory framework for pri-
vate pension  
￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿ 
Other:   ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿ 62 
Market-Based Arrangements  Yes     No  Yes     No  Yes     No  Yes     No  Yes     No  Yes     No  Yes     No  Yes     No  Yes     No 
Savings/credit form NGOs …  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿ 
Crop insurance  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿ 
Property insurance  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿ 
Private pension plans  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿ 
Private insurance for health  / 
disability 
￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿ 
Private insurance for life  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿ 
Other:  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿ 
Informal Arrangements  Yes     No  Yes     No  Yes     No  Yes     No  Yes     No  Yes     No  Yes     No  Yes     No  Yes     No 
Exchange of labor bw. hh  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿ 
Transfer of cash, food, livestock   ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿ 
Child fostering  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿ 
Reliance on children  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿ 
Dis-saving   ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿ 
Migration  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿ 
Tied labor  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿ 
Share cropping  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿ 
Savings/insurance associations   ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿ 
Other:  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿  ￿         ￿ 
Source: adopted from Heitzmann et al., 2001: Annex 1 Template 4-6 
* Analysts have to select population groups that are meaningful in the country context (i.e., vulnerable groups) 
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Template 8: Assessing the effectiveness of SP interventions – Checklist to examine their sustainability, targeting performance, 





q  What is the cost of each program as percent of gross domestic product (GDP)? 
q  What is the budget or expenditure allocation to each social protection program as a percent of total government expenditure and of social protection 
expenditure? 
q  What is the source of financing for each program (external or internal)? Are funds earmarked? Are there issues of intergovernmental financial flows? 
q  Is this source of finance likely to shrink or to grow over time in concert with need? 
q  Is the program in conflict with existing policy or legal or regulatory frameworks that will undermine its sustainability? 
q  What is the unit cost of the intervention (for example, to reduce the unemployment rate by 1 percentage point or to transfer $1 to the target group of a 
social assistance program)? 
 
Targeting Performance 
q  What percent of targeted and non-targeted groups are covered by the program? 
q  What percent of the transfer is going to poor and to non-poor groups? 
q  What is the budget or expenditure allocation for each program by administrative unit, by rural or urban location, by ethnicity, by gender? How does 
this correspond to the distribution of poverty by these factors? 
 
Administrative Costs 
q  What is the administrative cost as percent of the total cost? 
q  Is it so high as to be unreasonable? 
q  Would additional spending allow significant improvement in some aspect of the program and thereby improve its impact significantly? 
q  How do these costs compare across programs? 
 
Institutional Structure 
q  Which ministries operate the programs and at what level (national, regional, community)? 
q  What type of institutional delivery mechanism is employed by the program (direct government delivery, government contracts with NGOs or private 
sector, social fund)? 
q  Is the overall capacity (staff, equipment, transport, administrative budget, procedures, information systems) adequate to implement the program well? 
q  Are there issues of coordination between agencies or levels of government? 
q  Do the institutions and their agents have incentives to act in ways that ensure that the program is well implemented? 64 
q  Does the institutional delivery system facilitate proper targeting? 
q  Are systems adequate for participation or client voice? 
 
Incentive Effects 
q  What are sources and potential magnitudes of unintended effects at the program level? (These may vary by type of program. For example, in a public 
works program that uses private contractors, local contractors or supervisors may cut workers’ wages below the program wage to cover costs of trans-
porting workers to work sites or maintaining workers’ sleeping facilities at work sites.) 
q  What are the program’s unintended effects at the household or individual level with respect to work incentives, fertility, household formation? (In con-
sidering effects on work incentives, the nature of the labor market and the pattern of work of the poor in the country needs to be kept in mind.) 
q  What are potential sources of household or individual-level unintended effects (institutional delivery mechanisms, targeting mechanisms, level of 
transfer), and can they be minimized? 
q  What will be the likely impact on the level of private transfers and household coping arrangements? 
 
Constraints 
q  Are there institutional, infrastructural, financial, or political constraints to effective program operation at present? 
q  Are there existing institutions to support operation of a new program? If not, can they be set up quickly? 
q  Do staff members have appropriate skills and training to implement programs? 
q  Are there funds to implement the program? 
q  Is there political will to sustain the program? 
q  Are there aspects of the program that may be constrained by cultural considerations (for example, for some countries, women doing heavy labor on 
public work sites)? 
q  Do households face any constraints in receiving the benefits of the programs (high transport cost, overcrowding, long waiting periods to receive bene-
fits, language barriers with service providers)? 
Source: Coudouel et al., 2001a: 16f. 
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ANNEX 2: Country Examples 
 
Annex 2a: An example of a risk management assessment exercise: Arrangements for risk management in Togo 
 
  Informal/ endogenous* Informal/ exogenous* Formal/ private Formal/ public 
Prevention         
  •  Strengthen human capital 
(community-paid teach-
ers/schools) 
•  Strengthen/protect reve-
nues (anti-erosion meas-
ures, migration) 
•  Occult/traditional rites 
•  Strengthen human 
capital (apprentice-
ship) 
•  Traditional cere-
monies 
 
  •  Strengthen/protect human capital 
(education health, VET, agricultural 
extension, regional social funds) 
•  Regulate against accidents & ine-
quality (traffic code, construction 
code, environ. regul., labor m. pol. 
•  Provide services and infrastructure 
(vaccination, dams) 
Mitigation         
   Portfolio Management  •  Diversify (crops, jobs) 
•  Invest (human, physical 
real assets) 
  • Invest in multiple 
financial assets 
 
   Insurance  •  Reciprocate (mutuelles, 
tontines, professional asso-
ciations)  
•  Strengthen social capital 
(marriage, folk groups, 
ceremonies, traditions) 
•  Pool risks (cereal 
banks, village banks) 
•  Itinerant banks 
• Buy private insur-
ance 
•  Provide social security (CNSS and 
CRT) 
     Hedging  •  Extended family       
Coping         
  •  Diminish human capital 
(reduce meals, take chil-
dren out of school) 
•  Diminish economic capital 
(borrow, sell) 
•  Diminish social capital 
(child labor, borrow, plead) 
•  Diminish social 
capital (child trade) 
•  Diminish economic 
capital (borrow from 
usurers 
•  Charity 
• Diminish economic 
capital (borrow 
from bank and 
MFI) 
• NGO programs 
•Protect economic capital  
(AGETUR, regional social  
funds, emergency aid) 
•Protect human capital (food  
aid, emergency aid) 
Source: adopted from Bendokat and Tovo, 1999:15; *endogenous arrangements are organized by the prospective beneficiaries, exogenous ar-
rangements are organized by agents generally not belonging to the country. 66 
Annex 2b: An example of a risk assessment exercise: Risk factors in Togo 
 
  Individual and household level  Community level  National level 
Natural factors  •  Agricultural productivity (soil 
erosion, low fertility) 
•  Health (poor sanitation, smoke 
exposure) 
•  Agricultural productivity (envi-
ronmental degradation, natural dis-
asters) 
•  Health (unhealthy habitat, unsafe 
water 
•  Primary sector services (natural 
disasters, limited natural resources) 
•  Demographic pressure 
•  Epidemics (AIDS) 
Social factors  •  Health (disease, old age, handi-
cap) 
•  Education/Information (illiteracy, 
low education, isolation) 
•  Social capital (high dependency 
ratio, intra-household inequality, 
household break-up) 
•  Human capital (limited access to 
social services (health, education, 
family planning) 
•  Social capital (discrimination, 
harmful traditional practices) 
•  Human capital (insufficient and 
inefficient sectoral policies and 
programs 
•  Inequality (discrimination, ineq-
uitable and inadequate budget allo-
cation) 
Economic and political factors  •  Income (low returns to labor, un-
employment, irregular salaries, no 
access to credit) 
•  Inter-household inequality (in ac-
cess to land, rights and duties r e-
lated to social standing)  
•  gender  discrimination (unequal 
access to productive assets) 
•  Income (limited access to land, 
economic infrastructure, and e m-
ployment opportunities) 
•  Isolation, remoteness 
•  Inefficient production systems 
•  Assets and income (limited land, 
economic infrastructure and e m-
ployment opportunities) 
•  Structural inequalities (poorly 
integrated market for food prod-
ucts, poor rural infrastructure) 
•  Governance (fiscal problems, 
land tenure, clientelism, corrup-
tion) 
Source: adopted from Bendokat and Tovo, 1999:6. 
 
Bendokat and Tovo (1999) attempted to identify the risks by which the Togolose are exposed. They recognize that the distinctions between the 
nature of the risks (natural, social, economic and political) and the correlation (individual and household, community and nations) are not always 
clear-cut. In this table, the risks which lead to the basic outcomes are named in brackets. For example, Bendokat and Tovo (1999) cite (low) cite 
agricultural productivity and health as natural factors at an individual and household level. They are outcomes of the risk soil erosion, low fertility, 
poor sanitation and smoke exposure. 67 
Annex 2c: An example of a risk and risk management assessment exercise: The Dominican Republic – Risks by age group, 
leading indicators of risks with current values, uncovered poor and possible measure to manage risks 
Age 
Group 
 Main Risks  Leading Indicators  
of Selected Risks 
Indicator Value 
(1998) 
Number of  Poorest 10% 
and 30% Uncovered, 1998 
Covering the Gap with Measures of: 




Poorest 10%  Poorest 30%  Risk Prevention  Risk Coping 












(65%  rural) 
- Reduce poverty 
- Increase coverage of 
ECD programs   
- Care of malnourished 
5 years  Stunted  child development - Pre-primary cover-
age 




-  Reduce poverty 
-  Increase cov. ECD pro. 
- Care of malnourished 
6-13 years  Low human capital devel-
opment 









-  Increase coverage pri-
mary & secondary edu-
cation 
- Scholarships 
- Income support tied  
to school attendance 
       - Grade repetition  ---  5.7  ---  ---     
    - Late entry  ---  ---  ---  ---  -  Reduce late entrance, 
repetition, raise quality 
- Remedial education 
14-17 
years 
 Low human capital devel-
opment 










-  Raise secondary school 
enrollment 
- Scholarships 
- Income support  
    - Grade repetition  ---  5.7  ---  ---     
    - Late entry  ---  ---  ---  ---  -  Reduce late entrance, 
repetition, raise quality 
- Remedial education 
  Unemployment, low wages  - Youth Unemploy-
ment 




-  Employment   
18-24 
years 
Low human capital devel-
opment 










212,000     
(57% rural) 
- Raise secondary school 
enrollment, and reduce 
high drop-out rates 
- Scholarship, 
- Income support tied 
to school attendance 
and/or training activ. 














- Raise school enroll. by 
improv. access & quality 
- Improve access of poor-
est to tertiary education 
 
* Young people actively looking for a job, plus young people who did not get a job and did not continue looking for one or were waiting for results of application 
for employment.    68 
Age Group  Main Risks  Leading Indicators 
of Selected Risks 
Indicator Value  Number of  Poorest 10% 
and 30% Uncovered, 1998
Covering the Gap with Measures of: 
      Poorest 
10% 
Poorest 30%  Poorest 
10% 
Poorest 30% Risk Prevention  Risk Coping 
  -  Inactivity (vio-
lence, substance 
abuse, etc.)  
- Inactivity  ---  ---  ---  ---  -  Employment  -  Remedial education 
-  Youth programs 









-  Labor intensive growth-  Income support 
-  Remedial education 
-  Targeted training/job 
search assistance 
    - Below poverty earn-
ings (underempl.) 
---  ---  ---  ---  -  Flexible labor market   
Over 65 years  -  Chronic diseases 
 
- Health insurance 
coverage 




135,000  - Increase coverage of 
health insurance 
- Increase coverage of 
health care for the eld-
erly 
  -  Low income  - Pension coverage  ---  2.3**  50,000  135,000  - Increase coverage of 
pension system 
- Increase coverage of 
non-contributory pen-
sions 




-  Poor health care 
 











- Health insurance 
 




- Basic Services 
 
 
- Natural Disasters 
-  Poor housing con-
ditions 
 




- High frequency of 
hurricanes, floods 
- Housing deficit 
 
 
- Indoor running water 
- Indoor sanitation 
 
- Damages of hurri-






































- Promote savings and 
mortgages 
 
- Investment in water 
 
- Investment in sanita-
tion  
-  Relocation of families 
to safe places 
- Improve housing  
- Housing subsidies 
- Relocation of families 
- Land titling 
- Subsidies for water & 
sanitation connection 
for the poorest 
 
- Temporary shelter pro-
vision 
- Food / medicines 
Source: World Bank (2000b)  Annex 3: PROST 
 
Pension reforms are an important part of providing better social protection for formal sector workers in 
most countries. Unsustainable pension expenditures frequently squeeze out all other types of social spend-
ing with major implications for broader social protection as well. Given the potential economic and politi-
cal repercussions, it is essential one undertakes a systematic analysis of the costs and benefits of pensions 
reforms and alternatives available. Under the twin pressures of demographic aging and the maturing of 
pension schemes, it is not easy to undertake reforms which are both fair to all relevant stakeholders and 
fiscally sustainable.  
 
The World Bank’s pension reform options simulation toolkit, PROST, models pension contributions, enti-
tlements, system revenues and system expenditures over the long term. The model is designed to promote 
informed policy-making, bridging the gap between quantitative and qualitative analysis of pension regimes.  
It is a flexible, computer-based toolkit, easily adapted to a wide range of countries’ circumstances. It can 
also be used for other types of social payments, such as family allowances on either a contributory or non-
contributory basis. 
 
PROST is designed to answer the following kinds of question: 
•  How much will the pension system cost in the future? Is it viable and sustainable? 
•  What kind of benefits can people expect to receive in the future? 
•  Is the pension system equitable? Does it provide a decent retirement income to different categories of 
people? 
•  How large are the government’s implicit pension liabilities? 
•  How would broadening coverage, changing retirement age or adjusting contribution rates affect the 
system? How will costs, expenditures and liabilities change under various reforms? 
 
The model takes country specific data provided by the user. It generates population projections, which, 
combined with economic assumptions, are used to forecast future numbers of contributors and beneficiar-
ies. These in turn generate flows of revenues and expenditures. The model then projects fiscal balances, 
taking account of any partial pre-funding of liabilities.   
 
A separate module allows users to specify individual types, by gender, age of starting work, income levels, 
mortality experience, and work experience to determine how the pension system treats each of these indi-
vidual types, allowing the user to do distributional analysis. The output provides this information for co-
horts over time as well, allowing analysis of both intergenerational and intragenerational distribution. This 
type of analysis can be done for the current system as well as for proposed reforms, giving the user a sense 
of winners and losers under each type of reform.   
 
All of the modules allow for analysis of the sensitivity of results to key demographic and economic pa-
rameters, such as fertility, longevity, wage growth and interest rates. PROST is easy to use, with training 
programs, clear and concise manuals, documentation of underlying formulae, and troubleshooting, techni-
cal  support.  Model assumptions are transparent and sensitivity analysis is readily accessible. 
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